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Abstract
This dissertation explores novel data security and privacy problems in the emerging
smart grid.
The need for data security and privacy spans the whole life cycle of the data in
the smart grid, across the phases of data acquisition, local processing and archiving,
collaborative processing, and finally sharing and archiving. The first two phases
happen in the private domains of an individual utility company, where data are
collected from the power system and processed at the local facilities. When data are
being acquired and processed in the private domain, data security is the most critical
concern. The key question is how to ensure the data availability and integrity for
their uses in the private domain and later in the public space. Hence, we devote
Chapter 2 to the vulnerability assessment of the phasor network, which deals with
the data security in the private domain.
After the initial two phases, some of the data enter the public space. In the public
space, data privacy is another challenging requirement on top of data security. We
select three aspects of data privacy issues in the smart grid to illustrate the how
the new technologies like cloud computing, homomorphic encryption, and advanced
cryptography can form a synergy to solve these problems. Chapter 3 introduces a
solution of secure outsourcing of dynamic simulations leveraging cloud computing;
Chapter 4 presents a multiparty privacy-preserving spectrum estimation; Chapter 5
put forward a new mechanism for secure storage and sharing of power flow data for
situational awareness.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Recent years have witnessed the rapid development of smart grid technologies. Smart
grid, as seen in Figure 1.1, is defined in Office of Electicity Delivery and Energy
Reliability, Department of Energy (2009) as:
... a class of technology people are using to bring utility electricity delivery systems
into the 21st century, using computer-based remote control and automation ...
The core idea is that by leveraging more advanced two-way communication infrastructures, the smart grid provides salient features such as improved interoperability,
better efficiency, enhanced reliability, and so on.
Compared with legacy power grids, the smart grid boasts more advanced
communication infrastructures, such that more and a wider variety of data are
collected and used for optimizing the control and supporting decisions making during
the operation and planning of the power grid. For example, with the advanced
metering infrastructure (AMI), real-time power loads can be monitored, and the
demand response can be more precise and timely.

Take another example, the

phasor network, a.k.a Phasor Measurement Units (PMU) network, enables direct
and accurate measurements of the power grids’ real-time state in different locations,
providing better situational awareness and decision makings for operators and power
system planners. Data, of a wide variety and from a host of various entities, play a

1

Figure 1.1: Conceptual model of smart grid. Source: Office of the National
Coordinator for Smart Grid Interoperability (2010)
vital part in the emerging smart grid. As the smart grid’s dependence on data keeps
growing, data security and privacy become a critical concern. In reality, data security
and privacy breaches continue to occur once a while. Most recently, according to
Silver-Greenberg et al. (2014), the famous financial institution J.P. Morgan Chase was
reportedly intruded by attackers, causing the leak of customer contact information
and stealing of employees’ credentials. More relevantly, Miller and Rowe (2012)
surveyed numerous cyber-security incidents in critical infrastructures caused by the
data security and privacy issues. These incidents led to immense losses with respective
to efficiency and finance of the affected entities. For this reason, we are motivated
to explore data security and privacy issues associated with a variety of smart grid
technologies. However, it is worth noting that in this dissertation, we restrict our
discussion to the data security and privacy at the level of entities in the bulk
generation, transmission, and, control in the smart grid such as utility companies,
ISOs, area control centers, and so on. In contrast, the security and privacy of the
consumer data in the smart grid are widely investigated in the literature Borges et al.
(2014); Thoma et al. (2013); Baharlouei and Hashemi (2014); Elaine Shi et al. (2011).
2

Data security in our discussion consists of two aspects: data availability and
integrity. Availability means that the data should be accessible when needed. It
is especially important for time-sensitive applications such as real-time situational
awareness. In the network security research, data availability is primarily subject
to denial-of-service (DoS) attacks if the underlying communication network fails
to defend against such attacks. DoS attacks attempt to slow down, obstruct, or
corrupt the normal network communications either by saturating the resources of
victim machines so that services to legitimate users are affected, or by blocking the
communication channel (e.g. taking down routers or jamming the wireless channel)
between the legitimate users and the application server Kaufman et al. (2002) .
Integrity dictates that the data being used should be intact i.e. accurate, complete,
and genuine. The data integrity can be undermined by compromising and intruding
the underlying data transferring and storage facilities so as to make unauthorized
modifications to the data. For many applications, especially power system control
algorithms, which uses data from remote sources for decision-making, wrong data
could lead to misinformed decision and devastating consequences. For example, by
falsifying the measurements of meters that have been compromised, the false data
injection attack Liu et al. (2009) attempts to mislead the state estimation process to
make falsified estimations. Degradation of data security can seriously affect the overall
reliability and efficiency of the smart grid. The challenge of ensuring data security
in the smart grid lies in that the smart grid involves many new technologies and
standards with stricter requirements on reliability and low latency as compared to the
conventional data communication network. The knowledge accumulated regarding
the data security in smart grid is also much less than that of the data security in
the more often used conventional Internet. Dealing with data security in the smart
grid requires new ways of thinking and good understandings of both the computer
network technologies and power systems.
Existing works on the aspect of data security in the smart grid such as Mo
et al. (2012); Wang and Lu (2013); Yan et al. (2012a); Lu et al. (2010); Metke and
3

Ekl (2010); Liu et al. (2009) either provide high-level overviews of network security
challenges in the context of the smart grid and point out potential weaknesses in
communication infrastructures of the smart grid, or focus on analyzing aftermaths of
data security breaches from the angle of the power system, assuming the presence
of effective attack vectors and techniques.

However, little information detailing

comprehensive assessing methodologies and results regarding the data security of
specific smart grid technologies can be found in the current literature.

In this

dissertation, we attempt to address this limitation by using the phasor network
as an example to assess and demonstrate the vulnerabilities existing in the current
standards and technologies employed by the smart grid.
Data privacy, in this dissertation, refers to that data should not be disclosed
to any party without the authorization of the data owner, even in situations where
the data are intended to be shared. Just as North American Electricity Reliability
Corporation Confidentiality Agreement for Electric System Operating Reliability
Data North American Electric Reliability Corperation (2009) points out that “the
operational reliability data may contain proprietary information and unequal access
to operational reliability data may result in unfair advantages and disadvantages in
the electricity market”, in order to maintain a cooperative and sustainable ecosystem
for the smart grid, ensuring data privacy is equally important to data security.
Consider that if a particular smart grid technology requires sensitive data from a
host of entities but provides no guarantee of privacy, prospect users are likely to
restrain from using it despite the benefits the technology promises. Dealing with
data privacy in the smart grid is challenging because of two reasons. First, how
to satisfy the need for information while minimizing the disclosure of private data
is a non-trivial consideration. Second, for time-critical applications like wide area
situational awareness that requires private data from individual utility companies,
there appears no easy answer to meet the strict time constraint and preserve the data
privacy simultaneously.

4

Private domains of
individual utility companies

Life cycle of data in
the Smart Grid

Public space of the
Smart Grid

Single party/multiparty
collaborative processing of
private data in the public space

Local processing and
archiving

Data sharing and archiving
in the public space

Data acquisition

Need for data
security and privacy

Data privacy
Data Security

Figure 1.2: The life cycle of the data in the smart grid and their needs for data
security and privacy protections at different phases
The majority of the research on the data privacy in the smart grid by Khurana
et al. (2010b); Borges et al. (2014); Lu et al. (2010); Thoma et al. (2013); Baharlouei
and Hashemi (2014); Elaine Shi et al. (2011) focuses on the privacy of consumer data.
While obviously an important topic, it covers only a fraction of the data privacy issues
in the smart grid. In this dissertation, we try to expand the scope of research of data
privacy in the smart grid. Specifically, we investigate the data privacy issues in a host
of scenarios involving the bulk generation, transmission, and operations.
The need for data security and privacy spans the whole life cycle of the data in
the smart grid, with, however, different emphasis on distinct phases of the life cycle.
As shown in Figure 1.2, any data in the smart grid go through a life cycle consisting
of up to four phases: data acquisition, local processing and archiving, collaborative
processing, and sharing and archiving. The first two phases happens in the private
domains of individual utility companies, where data are collected from the power
system and processed at the local computing facilities. The data acquired in this

5

phase range from grid data, utility data, market data, and so forth as described in
Huang and Guttromson (2005). After the initial two phases, some of the data enter
the public space. In the public space, data contributed by different utility companies
may directly go to the sharing and archiving phase without further processing. For
example, the power flow data from various utility companies are used for wide area
situational awareness. Alternatively, some data may need further processing in the
phase of collaborative processing in the public place. Collaborative processing occurs
when parties other than the data’s owner take part in the processing. It is desirable
when the computation burden is so heavy that offloading it to an entity with abundant
computational resources, such as the cloud, can achieve better efficiency and economy.
Another reason is that if the processing involves private data from multiple parties,
for the fairness and data privacy, the processing is delegated to a third party. The
processing results eventually return the private domain for local usage, or enter the
sharing and archiving phase in the public space, from which the utility companies,
ISOs, control centers may request data.
When data are being acquired and transferred in the private domain, data security
is the most critical concern since only a single utility company is concerned. The
key question is how to assure the data availability and integrity for its uses in the
private domain and later in the public space. Nevertheless, data security alone
is insufficient once data enters the public space of the smart grid, which involves
fragmented components and entities of the smart grid both providing and requesting
data. These entities may include, utility companies, service providers, equipment
vendors, computing and data storage service providers, regional ISOs, control centers,
government authorities. For this reason, in the public space, data privacy is another
challenging requirement on top of data security.
Following the typical life cycle of data in smart grid, from initial acquisition and
local processing, to processing in the public space, and finally sharing and archiving,
we organize the remaining chapters as follows:

6

• Chapter 2 deals with vulnerability assessment of the phasor network (data
security in the private domain)
• Chapter 3 introduces a solution of secure outsourcing of dynamic simulations
leveraging the cloud computing (data privacy in the single party secure
computing)
• Chapter 4 presents a multiparty privacy-preserving spectral estimation (data
privacy in multiparty secure computing)
• Chapter 5 put forward a new mechanism for secure storage and sharing of power
flow data for situational awareness (data privacy in multiparty data sharing and
archiving)
Chapter 2 deals with the vulnerability assessment of the phasor network.
Experience with conventional IT communication networks reveals that many data
security issues are caused by the flawed design, implementation, or configuration of the
underlying communication network Kaufman et al. (2002); Stallings (1995). To avoid
such issues, it is of great importance to examine the security of the communication
infrastructure in smart grid. In Chapter 2, we focus on the vulnerability assessment
of phasor networks, which are new and increasingly important components of the
smart grid. Currently, there lack comprehensive examinations of the security of
phasor networks in the literature. Vulnerability assessment is a defense activity
by deliberately infiltrating a communication network with the intention to find the
security weaknesses before the attackers can do so and make real damages Centre for
the Protection of National Infrasctructure and Department of Homeland Security
(2010).

Our vulnerability assessment explores the vulnerabilities existing in the

phasor network, by both automated and manual assessment techniques. We then
test the feasibility of various attacks unique to the phasor network, by exploiting the
found vulnerabilities. The attacks to be examined include, code injection, credential
theft, false data injection, and DoS attacks. For each feasible attack, we report the
7

how to exploit the associated vulnerabilities, and discuss possible defense mechanisms.
We will also develop an open-sourced automated tools to facilitate future vulnerability
assessment of other phasor networks.
We start the discussion of the data privacy issues in Chapter 3, where we consider
a minimal scenario: a utility company wishes to outsource the power system dynamic
simulations to a semi-honest cloud but also would like to have privacy protection.
In power system operations and researchers, dynamic simulations are a widely used
to tool to investigate the power system’s dynamic behavior under certain conditions.
However, it incurs substantial computation burden due to the need to solve a large
amount of Differential Algebraic Equations (DAEs).

Recent endeavors Litvinov

(2014); ISO New England (2014) of leveraging the power of cloud computing to
conduct dynamic simulations have shown an immense potential of having faster, more
efficient, and less expensive dynamic simulations by the outsourcing the computation.
Outsourcing the computation, however, puts the data privacy at risk, since it entails
private computing over a public platform. As a consequence, with these privacy
concerns remained unresolved, the acceptance of the new computing paradigm is
open to question. We thus present a solution to cope with the privacy concerns
with respective to the outsourcing of dynamic simulations. In the proposed solution,
we make use of both the disguising technique to disguise the state variables as well
as software obfuscation technique to “encrypt” both the models and the software
simulator before sending them out to the cloud. By doing so, neither the input
sensitive information nor the final simulation result will be exposed to the cloud while
the majority computation burden is off-loaded to the cloud. We fully implemented
the proposed scheme, and it was shown that our scheme is capable of limiting the
adversary’s capability to obtain sensitive information during the course of outsourcing.
The limitation of the proposed scheme towards the end of the chapter.
Next in Chapter 4, we extend the discussion of the data privacy to a more
complicated multi-party scenario of collaborative processing of private data in the
smart grid. The scenario deals with multiple mutually distrusting parties wishing
8

to obtain the result of a particular processing method, say aggregation, average,
FFT, etc. , which requires private data from all the parties; the participating parties,
however, do not wish to disclose their private input to neither platform that executes
the processing method nor to their peer participants. Accordingly, besides the privacy
protection against the untrusted platform, which is the primary concern of the last
chapter, this chapter also takes into account the privacy protection against the peer
data providers. Specifically, in Chapter 4, we investigate the privacy preserving
multiparty spectral estimation using ambient synchrophasors for the monitoring
of inter-area oscillations. Recent researches by Sun et al. (2012); Vanfretti et al.
(2013); Chakrabarti et al. (2009); Brincker et al. (2001). show that it is a practical
approach to continuously track the frequency domain of ambient synchrophasors for
the monitoring purpose. However, as inter-area oscillations usually involve multiple
utility companies in concerned areas, the method requires synchrophasor data from
a number of different trust domains, which raises data privacy concerns. To address
these concerns, we propose a novel scheme that enables privacy-preserving multiparty
spectral estimations, which conducts spectral estimation directly over the encrypted
synchrophasor data, by employing the homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem, in order
to limit privacy leakages.

The scheme also facilitates the access control in the

resulted frequency domain to strengthen the privacy protection. Design choices on
optimizing the original design in order to boost the performance are also discussed.
Security analysis and performance evaluations are carried out. The proposed privacypreserving multiparty spectral estimation is also tested with a simplified model of the
WECC 179 bus system. Relevant results with respective to feasibility, scalability, and
latency are provided towards the end of the chapter.
Finally, Chapter 5 proposes a privacy preserving data management mechanism
for the smart grid. Different from previous chapters, which aims at fortifying the
data privacy during the processing of sensitive data over a untrusted environment,
the problem this chapter is concerned with is the data privacy issues during the
data sharing and archiving. We are motivated by that the wide area situational
9

awareness of a complex power system requires power flow data from multiple
competing and distrusting utility companies in the concerned area EIOC (2013); thus,
a data sharing mechanism that enables efficient data sharing and archiving as well
as robust privacy protection is highly desirable. As the data sharing mechanism
is intended to be used for situational awareness, in the design, we especially
consider how to simultaneously satisfy the requirements for the privacy preservation
and stringent time constraints in case the power flow data are to be used in an
emergency. Ultimately, the proposed data sharing mechanism empowers concerned
utility companies with flexible access controls over the amount and categories of the
data is to be shared. In addition, the trade-off between the performance and privacy
preservation is adjustable. Accordingly, proposed scheme can well adapt to the both
data sharing in the usual situation, which prefers high privacy protection over the
performance, as well as data sharing during an emergency, where the performance is
the top concern. Security analysis and performance evaluations will be carried out
with the power flow data of IEEE standard test systems University of Washington
(2014).
As the concluding remarks for this introduction, the transition from the legacy
power grid to the smart grid entails a closer integration of new information
technologies and inevitably raises concerns about data security and privacy. However, data security and privacy issues can be addressed with careful designs and
implementations, as demonstrated by the four data security and privacy problems we
discussed in this dissertation.
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Chapter 2
Vulnerability Assessment of Phasor
Networks
2.1

Introduction

The smart grid is introducing many salient features such as wide-area situational
awareness, precise demand response, substation automation.

These features are

enabled by data communication networks that facilitate the collection, transfer, and
processing of a wide variety of data regarding different components of the smart grid.
For example, smart meters collect granular residential energy consumptions, which get
aggregated through the advanced metering infrastructure (AMI), the communication
network for the smart meter data NETL Modern Grid Strategy (2008), for the realtime load monitoring and the fast demand response. The substation automation
system (SAS) allows for commands that trigger the preventative controls such as
“tripping” relays, to be transferred within a substation and across substations, using
the underlying data communication network compliant to IEC 61850 International
Electrotechnical Commission (2014). As a result, the smart grid’s heavy dependence
on data inevitably poses a great challenge to ensure the data integrity and
authenticity.
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Figure 2.1: Typical SCADA network, Source: Government Accountability Office
Report. GAO-040354 United States Government Accountability Office (2004)
In the meanwhile, another trend of “de-isolation” is also on the rise along with
increasing adoption of computer-based communication networks in the smart grid.
For decades, the legacy networks rely on its physical isolation from the outside
world, i.e. the air-gappedness, to provide the security protection. However, in the
past decade, in response to the demands for automation and information sharing,
the boundary between the internal communication network of the power grid and the
Internet has been increasingly blurring Young (2014b,a). Figure. 2.1 United States
Government Accountability Office (2004) illustrates the how a typical the power
system control network gets physically connected to the Internet in today’s power
grid system. As such, even though with defending mechanisms like firewalls deployed,
the internal network can no longer be deemed physically isolated. Additionally, the
experience with information security in common computer network reveals that flawed
designs, implementations, and configurations of the communication network introduce
vulnerabilities. These vulnerabilities open opportunities for attackers to launch cyber
12

attackers, leading to data security breaches like the security breach of the Chase bank
Silver-Greenberg et al. (2014) and cases in Miller and Rowe (2012) affecting millions of
people. As more and more components in the smart grid are adopting the same class
of network technologies, we need to assess the vulnerabilities of these components,
before trusting and assigning critical responsibilities to them. The assessments should
include a variety of aspects including standards, software implementations, network
configurations.
In this chapter, we are motivated to assess vulnerability and enhance the network
security of the phasor network through penetration testings. We choose to investigate
phasor network because of its indispensable role in the future smart grids as well
as that the synchrophasor network has not been under comprehensive vulnerability
assessment in existing literature.

In this research effort, we attempt to gain

more insights with respective to the cyber security of the current phasor network
technologies by exploring, validating, and demonstrating vulnerabilities. Based on
the results, we also present best practices and practical recommendations to defend
against the identified vulnerabilities.
In the rest of the chapter, we will first revisit existing research with respective
to the cyber security of phasor network in Section 2.2. We will also review the
phasor network about its concept, fundamentals, and application in Section 2.3.
Especially, a small prototype of the phasor network will be introduced for penetration
testing in Section 2.3.3. Section 2.4 covers the details of the penetration testing,
including the procedures of the penetration testing, testing techniques, and a list
of potential vulnerabilities to be explored in the research effort. Furthermore, with
the found vulnerability, we present a practical exploit of the C37.118 protocol with
the benchmark WECC 158 model in the Section 2.5.3. Section 2.6 presents the
countermeasures to defend against the vulnerabilities.
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2.2

Related Works

The vulnerability assessment specific to the phasor network has been considered in
previous research.
Liu et al. (2009) points out that falsified PMU measurement data can mislead the
state estimation of the smart grid without being caught by the bad data detection.
This vulnerability may cause serious consequences to the operation of the power grid.
As one of the earliest inquiries specialized in the cyber security of synchrophasor
network, Stewart et al. (2010) investigated two aspects of the cybersecurity issue
of synchrophasor technologies, i.e. 1) the substation security, which is concerned
with the security threat where the attacker penetrates the phasor network through
the substation network, and 2) the information security, which deals with the
confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the synchrophasor data flowing out of
the substation. Numerous practical recommendations for mitigating the investigated
security problems are proposed. These include adopting multi-layered architecture to
place PMU multiple layers deep in the network, using unidirectional synchrophasor
streams (spontaneous mode) to defend against protocol manipulation, limiting remote
access, regulating exposing ports and services with firewalls, using VPNs or link
encryption to ensure the confidentiality and integrity.

The work also conducts

two test cases, i.e. network scan and man-in-the-middle attack to demonstrate the
vulnerabilities of an unprotected phasor network. This work discovers some of the
most serious vulnerabilities associated with the phasor network. It, however, lacks a
systemic and comprehensive vulnerability assessment.
Morris et al. (2011) focuses on the network congestion testing and protocol
mutation testing for the phasor network. They test PMU devices under a high volume
of network traffic and send the device mutated packets, and observe their impact on
the device. According to their result, all PMUs under test became unresponsive under
an excessive volume of network traffic. Additionally, mutated packets were also found
to cause individual network services or applications to crash. In their follow-up work
14

in Sprabery et al. (2013), the author proposed a rule-based intrusion detection method
to detect malformed IEEE C37.118 frames injected to the phasor network.
Beasley (2014) examines the security of the phasor network in the context of the
benchmark IEEE 68 bus (New England/New York) power system with real-time grid
simulators and SEL PMU devices. The research successfully replicates the results of
Stewart et al. (2010). It also discusses the classification of network traffic using sidechannel information in cases where phasor network employs encryption to defend
against traffic eavesdropping and manipulation. The paper suggests that further
testing needs to take place to get better understanding of the cyber security conditions
of the phasor network.
Beasley et al. (2014b) provides a survey of a wide spectrum of cyber attacks targeted at the phasor network, ranging from interruption, fabrication, to modification,
reported in previous research Bou-Harb et al. (2013); Yan et al. (2012b); Campbell
(2011); D’Antonio et al. (2011); Shepard et al. (2012); Baumeister (2010). This
work also points out open research topics that require further investigation, including
vulnerabilities of side-channels, replay attack, the fuzzing test of the phasor network.

2.3
2.3.1

Preliminary
PMU and Phasor Network

Phasor network is widely recognized as one of the key enabling technologies for the
future smart grid Office of Electicity Delivery and Energy Reliability, Department
of Energy (2009); North America Electric Reliability Corporation, NERC (2011). It
empowers the power system operators with 1) real-time support of grid operations
and decisions, 2) improve system planning and analysis, and 3) response-based
control applications. Take the 2003 US-Canada blackout, if the increasing angle
difference were noticed and proper measures were taken, the accident would have
been prevented, and billions of losses could have been avoided.
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Figure 2.2: Synchrophasor network model
Figure 2.2 depicts the typical architecture of a phasor network. A utility company
usually deploys phasor measurement units (PMUs) at intersecting locations of its
power system. PMUs send the measured data to the local phasor data concentrator
(PDCs) within the same utility. Local PDCs send the concentrated data to a central
data repository called SuperPDC, usually hosted by the regional Independent System
Operator (ISO). A “publisher-subscriber” model can describe the data communication
in a phasor network, where PMUs or downstream PDCs publish data while upstream
PDCs subscribe to receive measurement data from the subscribed PMUs Bobba et al.
(2010).
Essentially, PMU measurement data, are stamped measurements taken by PMUs
periodically (typically at 30 ˜120 Hz) from different locations on a power grid. All
measurements use a shared time reference (usually provided by the GPS clock with
one microsecond accuracy) to keep synchronized. The measurement data include:
• Voltage (three phases) magnitude and angle
• Current (all three phases) magnitude and angle
• Frequency
• dF/dt (change in frequency over time)
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Figure 2.3: The structure of a PMU data block
Some standards have been proposed for the communication between PMUs
and PDCs.

These include IEEE C37.118, IEEE 1344, BPA PDCstream, IEC

61850-90-5 Grid Protection Alliance (2014). In this research effort, we base our
vulnerability assessment on the most commonly used IEEE C37.118 protocol. The
same methodology and testing techniques can also be adapted to other standards.
As a protocol on the application layer, IEEE C37.118 can work with both serial and
network communications using IP (both UDP and TCP are supported). However,
recent installations have mainly used IP over Ethernet according to Martin et al.
(2014). For this reason, this research also assumes a synchrophasor network using IP
over Ethernet as the underlying communication technologies.

2.3.2

IEEE 37.118 Protocol

IEEE C37.118 standard is a standard proposed for the specific use of the data
transmission of the synchrophasor data. C37.118 defines four types of frames, namely
data, configuration, header, and command frames Martin et al. (2014). Figure 2.4
captures a example of establishing data transmission with these frames defined in
C37.118 protocol.
Data frames carries real-time measurements data from a PMU or PDC to
the measurement data subscribing devices, i.e. the recipient of the actual phasor
measurement data. An IEEE C37.118 data frame is captured in Figure 2.3. A
data frame consists of a header that specifies the message length, the source ID
(i.e. sender’s ID), a time-stamp, and other status information (e.g. source and quality
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Figure 2.4: A typical data transmission process by C37.118 protocol
of the data). Data blocks follow the header. Each data block contains a PMU’s realtime measurements with the timestamp specified in the header. If the data frame
is sent by a single PMU, it contains only one data block. The standard allows
a single data frame to encapsulate multiple data blocks corresponding to different
PMUs reporting to the same PDC. A data block is headed with status words that
can be defined by the network owner to indicate data validity, time source quality,
etc. Following the status words are measurement data, including phasors in either
rectangular or polar format, frequency, rate of change of frequency (dF/dt), analog
and digital quantities.
Configuration frames are sent by PMU/PDC to notify the subscribing device
the configuration of the publishing device, including the publisher’s device ID, data
format in the data frame, the number of PMU blocks in the frame, the number of
phasors, the number of analog values, rate of transmission etc. . Configuration frames
are very important, as the parsing of coming binary data frames would be impossible
without the information conveyed in the configuration frame. Three versions of
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Figure 2.5: A prototype of the synchrophasor network for penetration testing
configuration frames are currently supported in the latest standard, i.e. CONFIG-2,
CONFIG-2, and CONFIG-3 (optional), which corresponds to their respective request
for configuration command frames.
Command frames are sent from a data concentrator (subscriber, an upstream
PDC) to its publisher (downstream PDC or PMU) to coordinate the communication.
The command frames include request for CONFIG-2, CONFIG-2, and CONFIG-3,
starting data transmission, and stopping data transmission.
Header Header frames are also sent from PMU/PDC to the receiving device and
contain human-readable configuration and descriptions in ASCII format.
More details with respective to the C37.118 standard can be found the published
standard available at IEEE Standards Association (2014).

2.3.3

A small Scale Prototype of Synchrophasor Network

To conduct penetration testing of the synchrophasor network, we set up a small scale
prototype of synchrophasor network, which is shown in Figure 2.5. In the prototype,
PDC and PMU are connected to their respective local area network (LAN1 and
LAN2). Additionally, the PDC stores concentrated synchrophasor data on a historian
server running MySQL residing on the same LAN. Both LANs connects the wide area
network. As such, this prototype emulates a phasor network where the PMUs are
19

deployed at different substations, and they send their real-time measurement data
across the wide area network to a remote PDC deployed at the control center.
We choose LANs of PMU and PDC to be the penetration point in the later
vulnerability assessment. The reason is that the traffic in the WAN is typically
encrypted and protected through the use of security gateway Stewart et al. (2010),
performing a penetration in WAN inefficient if not impossible. Instead, since IEEE
C37.118 used by PMU or PDC does not include any encryption or authentication.
These communications within an unprotected LAN can be the ideal target of cyber
attacks.
We adopt the openPDC by Grid Protection Alliance (2014) as the PDC server
in the prototype. In addition to a real PMU device, we emulate the PMUs with
computers running PMU simulators provided by iPDC Khandeparkar and Pandit
(2014), which is an open-sourced Linux software package written in C++ and adheres
to the IEEE C37.118. Even though the PMU simulators are purely software based
and do not possess a real GPS module, they still get synchronized using the Network
Time Protocol (NTP) protocol. Furthermore, although the simulator does not possess
dedicated data acquisition hardware, it can synthesize PMU measurement data or
use the historical measurements as the data source in a simulated phasor data
transmission. Note that using PMU simulators does not affect the validity of our
research findings, because we are only interested in vulnerabilities associated with the
communication network and the software implementations, which are independent of
the data acquisition process.

2.4

Vulnerability Assessment

Vulnerability assessment is a network defense activity to attack the network of
interest ethically, with the purpose of discovering and addressing vulnerabilities before
the malicious attackers can do so and make real damages. In this research, we
will conduct vulnerability assessment through the penetration testing of the phasor
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network prototype described in the Section 2.3.3. We hope that this research effort
not only identifies vulnerabilities that undermines the network security of the phasor
network, but also illustrates the methodology of the vulnerability assessment of any
deployed phasor network.

2.4.1

Procedures of Penetration Testing

A penetration testing generally comprises of three phases: reconnaissance, exploration, and exploit development according to Centre for the Protection of National
Infrasctructure and Department of Homeland Security (2010).
The reconnaissance phase is the initial phase to collect information about the
network under test. It includes host discovering, operating system fingerprinting,
traffic monitoring. It can be done using host discovering and port scanning tools like
Nmap, Lyon (2009) and packet sniffing tool Wireshark Wireshark Team (2014) or
Scapy Biondi (2014). The reconnaissance phase may also include social engineering,
intelligence gathering that is not limited to the cyberspace as well. The result of
reconnaissance gives the tester ideas about potential vulnerabilities the network may
have.
The exploration phase aims at validating speculated vulnerabilities in the
reconnaissance phase, by automated and manual approaches.

The automated

exploration of the vulnerabilities of the phasor network is the same to the standard
hacking and leveraging scanning and enumeration. With the information gained in
the reconnaissance phase, it is possible to get a list of known vulnerabilities associated
with the technologies that are found to be used in the system under test. Software
packages like Metasploit Maynor (2011) can automate the process. For instance, if
a host is fingerprinted to be running a Windows operating system, the automated
tools can perform vulnerability scan and check the host against vulnerabilities that
are specific to that operating system and are previously reported to vulnerability
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database like National Vulnerability Database NIST (2014), Common Vulnerabilities
and Exposures CVE official site (2014).
For unknown vulnerabilities, the manual exploration is needed. Since the phasor
network is less deployed and has much smaller user base compared to the Internet,
few vulnerabilities are reported. As a result, manual exploration are expected to take
a significant part of the exploration phase.
The final phase is exploit development. This phase aims at proving that the found
vulnerabilities can indeed be exploited to launch practical attacks that impact the
function of the network in real practice.

2.4.2

Manual Penetration Testing Techniques

In this subsection, we briefly introduce the testing techniques that will be used in our
assessment.
2.4.2.1

Packet Sniffing

Packet sniffing allows a tester, or an intruder in real attacks, to eavesdrop the data
communication on the network under testing. If packets are transmitted in clear text,
with packet sniffing, an attacker can obtain the same information that is intended for
the legitimate users. Even if packets are encrypted, packet sniffing can still get the
side-channel information such as the packet arrival rate, length distribution, interpacket delay. The side-channel information can be used to deduce, for example,
whether a stream of packets belongs to a data stream of the phasor measurement
through side-channel analysis.
Packet sniffing in a shared media network, e.g. Ethernet using a network hub or
wireless local area network (IEEE 802.11) can be easily carried out by receiving all
packets in promiscuous mode. In a switched media network e.g.

a typical Ethernet

network using switches to connect the Ethernet hosts, techniques like ARP poisoning
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or MAC flooding are needed to reroute the traffic to the sniffer. More details about
packet sniffing in a switched Ethernet can be found in Wireshark Team (2014).
In our testing, both Wireshark wireshark.org (2014) are used for packet sniffing.
2.4.2.2

Packet Injection

Packet injection refers to an unknown third party (a tester or an intruder) sending
illegal packets to the network services or applications.

Injected packets are

constructed in such a way that they appear to be legitimate but will actually interfere
normal execution of the network services or applications.
Packet injection is already known for causing well-known attacks targeting at
network and transport layers, such as Smurf, IP-spoofing, TCP session hijacking. In
a similar way, we use packet injection to test the vulnerabilities specific to the C37.118
standard in this research effort.
The Scapy program Biondi (2014) is used in this research for packets injection.
2.4.2.3

Fuzzing

Initially induced by Miller et al. (1990), fuzzing is an effective way to find unknown
bugs and vulnerabilities in software programs and protocols.

This technique

enumerates all possible forms of input and supplies the input to software under test. If
the software has not been implemented with security consideration e.g. the software
inadequately validating the input or not handling exceptions properly, some inputs
may cause exceptions from the normal execution. In the same way, being aware
of these problematic inputs, the attacker can also leverage them to disrupt normal
communications of the phasor network.
For fuzzing test against a phasor network, the payloads of the various types of
frames are first enumerated according to the specification of the C37.118 standard.
These payloads are then assembled with the appropriate Ethernet, IP, and UDP
headers to form the respective fuzzing frames. The packets are then sent to the
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corresponding device: HEADER, CONFIG and DATA frames are sent to the PDC,
COMMAND frames are sent to PMU.
Among a number of tools for fuzzing tests, we use Scapy for this task. Scapy
allows us to develop our own Python script to customize the fuzzing test specific to
C37.118 defined network protocol and service. In contrast, other tools such as BED,
SFUZZ, SICKFUZZ only support common protocols such as FTP, HTTP, IMAP.

2.5
2.5.1

Results of Vulnerability Assessment
Reconnaissance

In the reconnaissance stage, we eavesdrop the traffic at both penetration points by
packet sniffing with Wireshark. The presence of PMU and PDC were successfully
confirmed by the capture of C37.118 frames. In particular, the captured C37.118
CONFIG frames also leaked the PMUs’ configuration information.

Figure 2.6: Wireshark captured IEEE C37.118 CONFIG-2 frame revealing all
configuration information about a PMU
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Figure 2.7: Seven layers of OSI model and example protocols for each layer
Figure 2.6 shows the captured configuration frame.

As seen, the captured

configuration frame divulges the attacker the information about the PMU ID Number,
IP and MAC address, TCP/UDP port number, substation name, data frame format
(number of phasors, number of analog signals, the length of status word, rate of
transmission, etc.). The leaked information allows the attacker to understand better
the overall network environment and, thus, to facilitate to explore vulnerabilities in
the exploration phase.

2.5.2

Vulnerability Exploration

As previously mentioned, the goal of exploration phase is to validate the possible
weaknesses of the phasor network, which are deduced from the information leaked
from the reconnaissance phase.
Vulnerabilities can be categorized according to which layer in OSI (Open Systems
Interconnection) model a particular vulnerability relates to. Figure 2.7 captures the
OSI model and the exemplary protocols for each layer.
C37.118 is often deployed on top of TCP/UDP, IP over Ethernet. Therefore,
any network vulnerabilities of the TCP/UDP, IP, or Ethernet also affects the phasor
network. However, since TCP/UDP, IP or Ethernet are widely used technologies and
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Table 2.1: Vulnerabilities to be validated in the Exploration phase
Cause of Vulnerabilities

Possible attacks

Lack of encryption
Lack of
user authentication
Lack of
message authentication

eavesdropping, replay
Packet sniffing
impersonation
Packet sniffing
man-in-the-middle attack Packet injection
Packet sniffing
frame modification
Packet injection
Packet injection
Denial-of-Service
Fuzzing
SQL injection
Packet injection
code injection

Unexpected frames
Lack of input validation

Testing technique

their security issues have well been studied and followed by the research community
and industry such as Kaufman et al. (2002); McClure et al. (2009), we put our focus
on the security issues specific to IEEE C37.118 protocol and software implementations
of PMU and PDC in this research effort.
Evaluating the information gathered in the reconnaissance phase and also taking
into the public information about the C37.118 standards, we list vulnerabilities that
we will manually explore and validate during the exploration phase in Table 2.1.
In general,these vulnerabilities are chosen for two reasons. First, they are easy to
exploit as none of these vulnerabilities requires physical access or proximity to the
PDC or PMU device. As long as the attacker is on the same LAN, it is possible
for the attacker to launch relevant network attacks. Second, the listed vulnerabilities
directly impact the phasor measurement data with respective to data’s confidentiality,
availability and integrity. The compromise of any one of the three principles will
render the phasor network, whose ultimate goal is to provide reliable and accurate
measurement data, futile.
We briefly explain the listed vulnerabilities as follows.
First, as we have already discovered in the reconnaissance phase, all C37.118
frames are transferred in clear. Hence, not only can attackers intercept and eavesdrop
configuration frames but it is also possible for attackers to eavesdrop for command
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and data frames. We use packet sniffing to confirm whether a phasor network is
vulnerable to eavesdropping. Results are reported in Section 2.5.2.2.
Second, as the C37.118 standard does not specify any user authentication
mechanism, it is possible for the attackers to impersonate a legitimate publishing
or subscribing devices and confuse, mislead, or sabotage other parties in the phasor
network. Relevant results are covered in Section 2.5.2.3.
Third, as the case of lacking user authentication, neither C37.118 includes any
message authentication mechanism. As a consequence, all frames are subject to
frame modifications; a receiving device is unable to distinguish legitimated frames
and modified frames. We use packet sniffing and packet injection to validate this
vulnerability. Results regarding this vulnerability is also discussed in Section 2.5.2.3.
Fourth, as a stateful protocol, a device that runs C37.118 protocol manages its
transition of states based on its current state and the frames it receives. If the
coming frames are expected under the current state, the device should make the state
transitions accordingly. If not, the device should also handle for the case properly.
In real practice, implementations of PMU or PDC may ignore the rare but not
impossible situation so that it become unresponsive or even crashes upon receiving an
unexpected frame. We use packet injection and fuzzing to test if the PMU and PDC
implementation in our phasor network prototype have such a vulnerability. Section
2.5.2.4 presents relevant results.
Lastly, PMUs or PDCs may not properly validate input, which leads to code
injection attacks. Injection ranked the top security risk according to The Open Web
Application Security Project (2014). Like web applications, entities on a phasor
network also need to process input data that cross trust boundaries. This opens the
opportunity for attackers to perform code injection attacks, especially SQL injection
attacks since relational database is often used in the implementation of the PDC
and also in the historian server of the phasor network. Lack of input validation
contributes to a great deal of cyber attacks targeting at web applications For example,
a PDC processes the measurement data reported by remote PMUs; a historian server
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stores reported measurement data into its relational database. Therefore, input
data should not be assumed trustworthy. In fact, knowing the flaws of the software
implementations, attackers can supply crafted input data to the PDC and PMU in
order to trigger the inherent flaws and cause malfunction from inside. We use fuzzing
and packet injection to test if the PDC or PMU appropriately validates external
input. Section 2.5.2.5 deals with the vulnerability of SQL injection.
2.5.2.1

Automated Testing

Metasploit, the automated penetration testing tool, were used to conduct automated
testing. Our automated testing using Metasploit did not find any known vulnerabilities of our small-scale prototype, because the prototype was made certain that all
hosts and routers on the network are updated and fully patched and that all unused
port are disabled. Real network conditions vary with the actual implementation and
configuration of the specific phasor network. To verify no known vulnerabilities exists
in the network, it is very critical that the phasor network under test be scanned by
the automated penetration testing tools.
2.5.2.2

Eavesdropping

We found that just like Wireshark can successfully capture the configuration frames
and obtain the information conveyed by the frame, it can also eavesdrop on any
unencrypted command and data frames.
Figure 2.8, 2.9 and 2.10 show the three types of command frames captured with
Wireshark.
Figure 2.11 shows the captured data frame.
2.5.2.3

Lack of User and Message Authentication

As of this writing, the C37.118 standard does not specify any authentication
mechanism to authenticate a user in the phasor network or a message’s origin. In our
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Figure 2.8: Captured command frame: Data transmission on

Figure 2.9: Captured command frame: Data transmission off

Figure 2.10: Captured command frame: request CONFIG-2
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Figure 2.11: Captured Data frame
testing, we have found that anyone who are on the same local area network (LAN) of
the PMU or PDC can forge and inject all four types of IEEE C37.118 frames to the
network spoof PMU and PDC in the network.
The frame spoofing consists of the following steps.
1. Capture an authentic frame that is of the same type as the frame to forge
and inject. The authentic frame provides necessary information for spoofing,
including the source and destination MAC address, IP address, and TCP/UDP
port.
2. Duplicate the captured frame but change bytes that indicate the actual
commands, measurements, or configurations to the spoofing value.
3. Change the time stamp of the frame.
4. Recalculate the checksum of the command frame so the forged frames may pass
the checksum checker at the receiving end.
5. Inject the forged frames into the network.
The rest of this subsection presents our testing result on spoofing attacks with
respective to command, configuration, and data frames, respectively.
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Command Frame spoofing
Command frames are sent by the subscribing device to publishing device to
establish and control the data transmission.
A command in a command frame is encoded with the third and fourth bytes of
the command frame payload. The commands and their corresponding codings are
illustrated in Table 2.2.
Table 2.2: Command bytes of IEEE C37.118 command frame
Data transmission off
Data transmission on
Request for CONFIG-2

Command bytes (in Hexadecimal)
0x01
0x02
0x05

As previously mentioned, without proper message authentication, it is trivial for
an attacker who has access to the local network to inject forged frame to spoof
recipients of the command frame i.e. the PMU.
In our test, during an ongoing data transmission, we first captured a legitimate
“Turn data transmission on” command frame, then we modified the captured frame
to forge a “Turn data transmission off” command frame and inject it at the LAN of
the PMU.

Figure 2.12: Legitimate Command Frame to turn on the data transmission

31

Figure 2.12 shows the legitimate command frame captured with Wireshark. As
seen, the captured frame was a “Turn Data Transmission On” command frame.
With the captured command frame, we use a Scapy script to forge a new command
frame with a “Turn Data Transmission Off” command. The forging was accomplished
by 1) replacing the time stamp in the captured command frame with the current time
stamp, 2)replacing the command bytes in the command frame to 0x01, i.e. “Turn data
transmission off” frame, and 3) recalculate the checksum. As the checksum is the only
validation mechanism, the receiving PMU could not distinguish the forged command
from legitimate ones. Therefore, the PMU will accept the forged frame and execute
the command contained in the forged frame.
Figure 2.13 illustrates the Wireshark capture of the forged “Turn Data Transmission Off’ command frame in flight.

...
Figure 2.13: Wireshark capture of the forged command frame
Green arrow points to the legitimate command frame. The red arrow points to the
forged one.
As a consequence of the spoofing, the PMU stopped sending measurement data
upon receiving the forged frame. Figure 2.14 captures PMU simulator’s console after
it received the falsified command frame. As seen, the PMU data stream was turned
off by the forged command frame.
This attack successfully resulted in a data outage for the subscribing PDC.
Configuration Frame spoofing
Configuration frames in IEEE C37.118 are sent from the subscriber upon the
receipt of command frames from the subscribers.
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Figure 2.14: The PMU’s console after the command frame spoofing attack
Wrong configuration frame misleads the subscribing PDC and prevents the
PDC from correctly processing the binary data in the payloads of data frames
sent subsequently from the publishing PMU due to the mismatch between the
configuration frame and data frames. For instance, if the forged frame that are later
accepted by the PDC changes the phasor format (from Rectangular to Polar and vice
versa), all measurement later received will be parsed based on the false data format.
In our test, in the same way as performing the command frame spoofing attack,
we first capture a legitimate configuration frame, based on which we forge a falsified
configuration to change the number of the phasors.

We then inject the forged

configuration frame when the subscribing PDC requests the publishing PMU to send
the configuration frame.
Our test showed that an attacker could successfully spoof the subscribing PDC
by sending the wrong configuration frame.
Figure 2.15 demonstrate that after spoofing the PDC with the wrong configuration
frame, subsequent data frames sent by the publishing PMU do not conform to the
spoofing configuration frame. The PDC cannot parse and interpret the data frames
with the received configuration frame.
Data Frame spoofing
An attacker can also inject data frames containing falsified measurement data to
the phasor network. By injecting the falsified data frame, an attacker can make the
PDC admits wrong data to the collection of phasor measurement data.
In our assessment, we first capture a legal data frame and use it as a template
to forge falsified data frames. The falsified data frames have the same format as the
legitimate one, but the only one phasor in the data frame is set to all zero value.
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Figure 2.15: Data frames cannot be associated with the right configuration frame
under a configuration spoofing attack
The falsified data frames are injected with an interval of 0.01 second. Figure 2.16
demonstrates the bogus data were reflected in the PDC’s output CSV file, which are
the data source to support higher level PMU data applications. As seen from the
figure, the shaded lines indicate that the multiple records of 0.000000, 0.000000 as the
phasor measurements named P 1 are inserted into the CSV file.
2.5.2.4

Fuzzing Test

Fuzzing tests were carried out to discover unknown vulnerabilities that exist in the
network services and applications. Our fuzzing test covered four types of C37.118
frames. During the fuzzing test, fuzzing frames were sent to the PDC and PMU
servers, and we monitored any abnormal behavior of the PDC and PMU.
To improve the efficiency of the fuzzing test, instead of blindly generating all
possible frames, we tested the PDC or PMU with only frames that adheres to
specification of the C37.118 standard and excluded frames that will apparently be
rejected by the PMU and PDC. For instance, a checksum is calculated over the
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Figure 2.16: Received phasor measurements during the data frame spoofing attack.
Red shaded frames are injected by the attacker
payload of any C37.118 frame and is appended to end of the frame, to detect bit
errors that occur during the transmission of the frame. If the appended checksum
does not agree with the checksum calculated on site with the frame at the receiving
end, the frame will be rejected by the recipient. In that case, the input data carried
by the frame will be discarded and not processed at all, rendering this random input
data useless in this test. Therefore, we may improve the efficiency by avoiding testing
fuzzing frames with an invalid checksum. To do so, we only randomize fields that
carry the actual input data and append a valid checksum accordingly.
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In general, to generate fuzzing frames, we first identify the bytes that are
fixed, which include SYNCHRONIZE word that specifies the type of payload
(0xaa0 , 0xaa3 ,0xaa4 correspond to Data, Configuration, and Command frames,
respectively) at the very beginning of the every C37.118 frame; the bytes that should
be fuzzed, which are the representation of input data that cross a trust boundary,
e.g.

the number of the phasors in a configuration frame, a measurement of voltage

in a data frame, or a command (turn data transmission on/off) in a configuration)
frame; lastly, the bytes that depend on other bytes: these are usually the checksum
at the end of the frame.
As an example, in order to fuzz a command frame that is 16 bytes long, we first
set the first two bytes to the respective SYNCHRONIZE word as 0xaa4 , where 0x
denotes an arbitrary hexadecimal digit. Since the last two bytes are reserved for the
checksum, we fuzz only the 3rd through the 13th bytes, inclusive. There are 214∗8
possible values for these bytes. For each of the possible values, the checksum of the
SYNCHRONIZE word and that value is calculated and appended to form the fuzzing
frame. In our prototype, the C37.118 runs on top of UDP, and the recipient of the
command frame is the publishing PMU. Therefore, the fuzzing frames should be sent
to the PMU by UDP datagrams, which is accomplished via packet injection.
During the fuzzing test, the PDC or PMU may exhibit abnormal behavior due to
reasons other than the fuzzing frames. For example, Morris et al. (2011) found that
the PMU may become unresponsive due to excessively high packet rate of coming data
frames. To determine whether a certain randomized frame may cause the failure of
the PMU or PDC, we need to exclude other potential causes like network congestion.
Therefore, we set the packet injection rate to 100 frames per second, which is a rate
that a typical PDC or PMU can handle without any loss of frames Morris et al.
(2011).
The fuzzing test are carried out with the scapy script fuzzing test.py. The
following are results of the fuzzing test against PMU simulator. PMU from different
vendors should have different test results depending on the quality of the product
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with respective to software implementation and standard compliance. However, the
same testing methodology and testing scripts are still applicable.
Command frame fuzzing test result
Command frames are sent from PDC to PMU for the control of the data
transmission. To test whether a PMU is affected by malformed command frames,
we run the fuzzing test scapy script to send fuzzing command frames to the PMU
during the normal communication. During the test, the PMU simulator became
unresponsive after receiving a specific kind of malformed command frame. A closer
examination reveals that the all fuzzing command frames causing the problem contain
the command of ”Request CONFIG-2 frame” from the subscribing PDC, with the
frame’s command bytes set to 0x05 and the frame’s source device ID number set
to the subscribing PDC’s ID number. When receiving that frame, the PMU server
sends its CONFIG-2 frame to the PDC without examining other fields of the frame
nor verifying whether the frame is malformed. Upon receiving the CONFIG-2 frame
from the PMU, the PDC follows the protocol and sends out a command frame to
inform the PMU to start the data transmission. However, the PMU has already been
sending phasor measurements, and it does not expect such a command at the current
state. Since the software implementation lacks proper handling of duplicate “Turn
data transmission on” command frames from the same subscriber, the PMU software
crashes accordingly.
The problem described above exposed a major design and implementation flaw
with the PMU server program under test: its design and implementation had not
considered unexpected command frames; sending duplicate ”Turn data transmission
on” command frames can easily crash the PMU server.
In general, the behavior of a PMU depends on its current state and the command
frame it receives. A certain state should properly handle all possible external inputs,
including the illogical input. In this case, during an on-going data transmission, a
“Turn data transmission off” command frame is the only logical frame a PMU is
supposed to receive from a legitimate subscribing PDC. However, the PMU should
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defensively take into consideration all possible command frames including illegal ones.
Otherwise, the behavior of a PMU is undefined and the stability is open to question.
Configuration frame fuzzing test result
Configuration frames are sent from publisher (PMU) to subscriber (PDC) upon
the publisher’s receipt of “Send CONFIG-2 frame” from the PDC.
Likewise, we used fuzzing test.py to perform the fuzzing test.
Our result showed that the openPDC software were not influenced by the fuzzing
CONFIG-2 frames and did not crash or have any behavior that would otherwise
indicate a vulnerability throughout the test.
Data frame fuzzing test result
Data frames are sent from the publisher (PMU) to the subscriber (PDC) to
transmit the actual measurement data.
In the data frame fuzzing test, data frames are randomly generated with a scapy
script and sent to the subscriber PDC during the normal data transmission. Our
result shows that the PDC did not crash or showed any abnormal behavior throughout
the test. The PDC accepted all randomized data frames and continued to function
properly on the data frames.
2.5.2.5

SQL Injection attack

SQL injection (SQLI) takes place when a program fails to validate inputs that cross
the trust boundary. As a result, malicious SQL statements are inserted for execution.
In a phasor network, SQL injection may happen when a PDC extracts configuration information from a configuration frame and saves the information into the
associated database using SQL statements. To be more specific, for the purpose of
dynamically manage and update the phasor network configuration, a PDC stores
the configuration information of the PMUs it is interacting with in a connection
table in a database. When a PDC receives a configuration frame from a PMU,
the PDC first looks up the connection table for the PMU with the PMU/DC ID
Number specified in the configuration frame, as shown in Figure 2.6. If the PMU
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already exists in the connection table, the configuration specified in the configuration
frame is then used to update the existing configuration. Otherwise, a new PMU
is added and registered with the specified configuration. The PDC performs the
table looking up by the querying the database with the statement SELECT * FROM
MAIN CONFIG TABLE WHERE DEVICE ID = PMU ID Number, where the PMU ID Number
is the PMU ID number indicated in the configuration frame.
If the PDC does not validate the input of PMU/DC ID Number supplied by the
configuration frame and PMU/DC ID Number is not strongly typed as a numeric
value, it is possible for the attacker to inject executable malicious SQL queries
by simply appending another query to the string of PMU/DC ID Number, which
makes the query do more than what is originally intended. As an example, using
the packet injection, an attacker can inject a configuration frame in which the
PMU/DC ID Number is specified as “2;DROP TABLE MAIN CONFIG TABLE”. If
the input is not checked against SQL injection, the statement to be executed
by the database becomes “SELECT * FROM MAIN CONFIG TABLE WHERE DEVICE ID
= 2; DROP TABLE MAIN CONFIG TABLE”, which is a valid batched query supported
by many database systems.

However, the batched query will first look up the

MAIN CONFIG TABLE where the DEVICE ID equals 2 and then delete the whole
MAIN CONFIG TABLE. Without the table, the PDC cannot function appropriately.
The SQL injection in the above example is a typical piggy-backed query based
SQL injection attack, according to the classification by Halfond et al. (2006). Our test
script also tested for other types of SQL injection attacks, including tautologies-based
attack, illegal/Logically incorrect queries, Union queries.
During our test, we found that both openPDC and iPDC effectively prevent SQL
injection attacks, because both software sanitize the input extracted from the frames
and use parameterized queries with strongly typed parameters, which eliminates the
chance of SQL injection.
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2.5.3

Exploit Development: A Practical Exploit of IEEE
C37.118: Data Stream Hijacking

When combining the above vulnerabilities found through the exploration phase,
attackers can perform more sophisticated attacks like data stream hijacking via
command and data frame spoofing together to maximize the impact of the attack.
In a data stream hijacking attack, attackers aim at taking over ongoing phasor data
transmission and sending wrong measurement data to the upstream PDC to mislead
the user of the data. Data stream hijacking attack is difficult to detect without
additional information as the receiving PDC cannot distinguish bogus data from
authentic ones.
In this section, we demonstrate a practical data stream hijacking attack with the
small-scale prototype of phasor network. Specifically, we show that how the attack
impacts the wide-area monitoring of the WECC 179-bus system model.
Consider a scenario where a phasor network is employed to obtain the early
warning and to maintain the situational awareness of the potential inter-area
oscillations. As proposed by Sun et al. (2012), this can be achieved by two procedures.
First, off-line clustering analysis is conducted to determine the zones (areas) of the
power system. Through off-line clustering analysis, the power system is first divided
into four zones, such that an interface between two adjacent zones may develop interarea oscillations during or after a contingency. Figure 2.17 demonstrates the reduced
WECC 179-bus model and the zones as a result of clustering analysis.
Second, PMUs are deployed to monitor the rotor angle of each zone. PMUs
at three generators within each zone to measure their respective rotor angles. The
PMUs monitoring the power systems are circled in 2.17. All PMUs send their realtime measurement data to a central PDC. Based on the concentrated measurements
at the PDC, the real-time angle of an individual zone is obtained by averaging the
measurements of angles reported by the three PMUs in that zone. Moreover, the
zone angles are input to the method to calculate risk scores presented in Sun et al.
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Figure 2.17: 179 bus power system
(2012) and establish real-time situational awareness via data visualization of the angle
difference.
Since we are only interested in the communication infrastructure of the power
system, we use the small scale prototype to simulate the phasor network described
above in this demonstration. We run 12 instances of PMU simulator on two computers
(6 on each) on LAN1 to emulate the twelve PMUs monitoring the power system. The
central PDC is emulated by a PDC at the other LAN2, which corresponds to the
network system of the control center. Additionally, it is assumed that an attacker
penetrates the LAN of PDC using a laptop. The network diagram is shown in Figure
2.18.
As introduced earlier, the PMU simulator allows users to specify the data source
to be sent to the subscribing PDC. To simulate the behavior of whole phasor network
during the power system contingencies, we set the data sources to be the rotor
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Figure 2.18: Demonstration of a data stream hijacking attack on a WECC 179-bus
system with the small scaled phasor network prototype
angles obtained from a dynamic simulation of a sequence of contingencies using TSAT
software of PowerTech Labs Power Tech Lab (2015). The applied faults include six
three-phase faults at 0s, 40s, 80s, 120s, 160s and 200s near bus 83 (Malin substation)
on lines 83# -172, 83# -170, 114# -124, 115# -130, 83# -94 and 83# -98 ( “#”
indicates the fault bus) to simulate a cascading failure. In other word, by replaying the
rotor angles obtained from the dynamic simulation on the respective PMU simulators,
we can completely reproduce the behavior of the phasor network during the cascading
failure.
Figure 2.19 captures the angles differences on potential out of step (POOS)
interfaces of 1-234, 14-23. As seen in the figure, the data received by the PDC provides
the correct situational awareness: the angle difference between POOS’s keeps climbing
as the cascading failure takes place.
In this demonstration, we show that a data stream hijacking attack targeting
a phasor network can change the result of situational awareness such that the
contingencies vanish from the situational awareness and, thus, blinds the operator.
A data stream hijacking attack consists of following procedures.
1. Attacker eavesdrops the communication between PDC and PMU at the LAN
of the PDC. During the eavesdrop, information about the command and data
frame format, PMU sampling rate, the IP and MAC address are collected and
analyzed for frame forging later.
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Figure 2.19: Normal angle difference over simulation time
2. Wait for the best timing such that the data stream hijacking attack can do the
most damage to the power system (e.g.

confuse the operator to the most

extent) and inject a false command for the PMU to turn off the data frame.
3. Send preselected measurement data by fabricating and injecting forged data
frames containing the falsified data, which may come from previously captured
measurement data.
In our demonstration, the data stream hijacking attack was launched at the
35th second, which is just prior to the application of the first fault. The attacker
hijacks the data stream transmission and keeps replaying to the PDC the rotor angle
measurements of all the 12 PMUs between 30th to 35th second it obtained through
eavesdropping.
Figure 2.20 illustrates the timeline for the exploit in an unprotected phasor
network.
Figure 2.21 showed the Wireshark packet captured during a replay attack.
As shown in Figure 2.22, during the attack, the resulting visualization of the
angles difference between interface 1-234 and 14-23 were manipulated such that the
inter-area angle differences keep unchanged. Based on this manipulated situational
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Figure 2.20: Time line for replaying attack in an IEEE C37.118 based phasor
network

Figure 2.21: Wireshark capture showing the replay attack
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Figure 2.22: Manipulated angle difference by data stream hijacking over simulation
time
awareness, the operator or automatic control is blinded and fails to apply preventative
controls to mitigate the inter-area oscillation.

2.6

Countermeasures and Mitigations

In this section, we talk about solutions or best practices to dealing with the above
vulnerabilities to prevent security breaches in reality.
All the manual penetration testing technique used in our assessment can also be
used as an attack technique by adversaries in real cyber penetrations. It is, therefore,
important to prevent them from happening in the first place.
Packet sniffing and packet injection can be greatly mitigated by employing
SSL/TLS (Secure Socket Layer/Transport Layer Security) or IPSec (Internet Protocol
Security) to encrypt the packets between electronic security perimeters (ESP) of PDC
and PMU Stewart et al. (2010).
With SSL/TLS or IPSec, the information, including the header, configuration,
command, and data frames which are transmitted between electronic security
perimeters (ESP) in the phasor network, will be encrypted at the transport layer
or the Internet layer, correspondingly. As such, attackers eavesdrop between ESP
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can only get the encryption of that information. As a result, attackers gains no
advantage through the eavesdropping. They even no longer can fingerprint the PDC
and PMU as the SYNCHRONIZE word at the beginning of the C37.118 frames are
also encrypted.
To counteract packet injections, we must authenticate packets’ origin and ensure
the integrity of packets on the fly.

Both can be accomplished by SSL/TLS or

IPSec, which utilize the public key infrastructure (X.509) certificates to authenticate
a legitimate host on the phasor network, and use message authentication code (in
SSL/TLS) or integrity check value (in IPSec) to make sure that the data are intact
during their transmission. Also, for the same purpose, IEC 61850-90-5 also introduces
keyed-hash message authentication code (HMAC) for message integrity verification
and authentication of message’s origin.
Notwithstanding, the protection provided by SSL/TLS or IPSec covers only the
network traffic between ESPs. Network traffic within an ESP (e.g.

the LAN of

the PMU or the LAN of PDC) is not encrypted. Hence, packet sniffing and injection
within an ESP is still possible. To overcome this, PMU and PDC should support
SSL/TLS or IPSec, which can support truly end-to-end encryption between publishers
and subscribers.
Thorough fuzzing test against the services and applications of phasor networks
are very helpful to find the design and implementation flaws and errors. It is of great
importance to eliminate the found flaws and errors before a PMU and PDC can be
put into real use.
To prevent SQL injection attack, best practice and programming guidelines
regarding the database related development such as The Open Web Application
Security Project (2014) should be enforced in the developments of services and
applications of phasor networks.
To defend against data spoofing attack, one should not solely rely on SSL/TLS
or IPSec. For one reason, most of the commercial PMUs on the market does not
support SSL/TLS or IPSec features; packet injection and data spoofing is still possible
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within an ESP. For another, SSL/TLS and IPSec themselves are not always secure.
There also exist attacks targeting SSL/TLS or IPSec, including DNS cache poisoning,
man-in-the-middle attacks, TLS/SSL Certificate. Additionally, bugs or errors in
the implementation of these security mechanisms can also undermine the security.
Therefore, it would be more secure to employ multiple defenses in tandem to minimize
the risk of data spoofing attacks when SSL/TLS falls short.
Two additional approaches are recommended.

The first one is adopting an

intrusion detection system (IDS) at the LANs of PMU or PDC. Instead of detecting
data fabrication and spoofing with cryptographic tools, IDS tackles the data spoofing
from the perspective of PMU or PDC’s behavior and the content of frames. An IDS
tries to differentiate abnormal communications from the normal based predefined or
self-learned rules. For example, the IDS proposed by Sprabery et al. (2013) defines
eleven rules, ranging from frame type check, protocol version check, to data frame size
check. Any monitored frame that violates the rules will be deemed as a malformed
frame, or a part of the potential attack. Therefore, the incident should be logged and
an alert should be generated. Also, the IDS proposed in Yang et al. (2013) utilized
the access control whitelists, protocol-based whitelists, statefulness of the C37.118
protocol, range, and length checkers to discriminate illegal frames.
The other way is using redundant devices to take the same measurement
independently in separate phasor networks Beasley et al. (2014a). In that case,
performing phasor data spoofing attack requires compromising more devices and
networks service, which significantly increases the difficulty and cost to perform such
an attack.
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Chapter 3
Secure Outsourcing of Dynamic
Simulations in Power Grid
Leveraging Cloud Computing
3.1

Introduction

Dynamic simulations play critical roles in power system research and operations. It
is a useful approach to accurately predict the dynamic behaviors of power systems
under contingencies such as generator tripping, line switching, and short circuit Chow
and Cheung (1992); Chow and Rogers (2000). In real practice, due to the heavy
computational burden of simulating large scale power systems, dynamic simulation is
currently conducted offline on hourly or daily basis, making it hardly useful in practice
to respond to emergent contingencies. For example, for a system of comparable size
to the Western Electricity Coordinating Council (WECC), commercial power system
software takes approximately 60 seconds to simulate 30-second system dynamics
following a single contingency using a local workstation with Intel Xeon(R) 3.2 GHz
CPU and 12.0 GB memory. The fact that dynamic simulations are not fast enough
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has unfortunately limited its applications in protecting modern power systems against
a huge list of critical contingencies.
Recently, outsourcing the dynamic simulations to the cloud has emerged as a
promising solution to the problem mentioned above. Pilot studies done by ISO New
England ISO New England (2014)Litvinov (2014) showed that by outsourcing the
heavy computational burden to the cloud, it is possible to conduct power system
simulations, not only much faster but also with less cost. According to Litvinov
(2014), an N-1-1 contingency analysis with 4,100 scenarios, which would have taken
1,700 hours at a commodity laptop, or 40 hours at the internal computing cluster of
40 cores, now needs a running time of only 1.5 hours with 150 Amazon EC2 nodes
for a total monetary cost of about $60. Additionally, with a commodity PC, it takes
around 10 hours to run one study with GE MARS, the Monte Carlo simulation-based
tool for power system resources adequacy analysis. In contrast, with 32 C3.large type
of Amazon EC2 instances, the running time comes down to 12 minutes and the cost
$1.66.
Despite that cloud computing has demonstrated its tremendous potential, the
fact that outsourcing requires dynamic simulation to take place in an external and a
potentially malicious facility (the cloud) gives rise to concerns about the information
security during the course of outsourcing, considering that both information required
by and the results produced from the dynamic simulation are sensitive and private
to the power grid owners. These concerns have restrained the utility companies
from taking advantages of the aforementioned outsourcing paradigms. Instead, they
would opt for conservative measures such as keeping all the computations local in
exchange for the absolute data privacy assurance. The primary goal of this chapter
is to explore the possibility to outsource the computation overhead without giving
away data privacy.
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3.2

Related Works

This work falls under the broad topic of non-interactive outsourcing of scientific
computation.

Some early research by Yao et al. (1982); Yao (1986); Chaum

et al. (1988) showed that any function can be securely evaluated. More recently,
with the breakthrough of fully homomorphic encryption, homomorphic encryption
appears as the most straightforward solution to computation outsourcing. Informally,
homomorphic encryption allows one (the cloud in our case) to execute encrypted
software over encrypted data to generate an encrypted result, which can be decrypted
by only outsourcers later. The problem is, however, even the state-of-the-art fully
homomorphic encryption Gentry (2009) is too inefficient for practical uses. Relatively
more efficient somewhat homomorphic encryption Naehrig et al. (2011) only supports
a very limited number of additive or multiplicative operations. As a result, the
prospect of directly applying homomorphic encryption to secure the outsourcing of
dynamic simulation is remote. Aside from homomorphic encryption, which aims
at protecting generic computing, cryptographic tools are also invented to realize
the outsourcing of modular exponentiation Hohenberger and Lysyanskaya (2005),
the outsourcing of ranked keyword search Wang et al. (2010a), the outsourcing of
multiparty back-propagationYuan and Yu (2013), the outsourcing of ridge regression
Nikolaenko et al. (2013), the outsourcing of decryptions of attribute-based encryption
ciphertexts Green et al. (2011). However, they focus on specific applications, which
are irrelevant to dynamic simulations. Additionally, these schemes more or less
employ computationally heavy cryptographic primitives like public key cryptography
pairing-based cryptography, which will introduce even more latency if they are used
to secure the dynamic simulations.
There are also many works on outsourcing of computations that do not heavily
rely on cryptographic tools. Wang et al. (2011b) investigates the problem of cloudbased outsourcing of linear programming for large-scale system. Their proposal,
however, dealt with only linear programming while the computations in dynamic
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simulations mostly involve nonlinear differential algebraic equations. Atallah et al.
(2001) studies extensively the problem with respective to secure outsourcing of
scientific computations such as sorting, template matching, string pattern matching,
and differential equations. However, dynamic simulation is not considered.

3.3

Problem Statement

In this work, we address the problem of privacy-preserving outsourcing of power
system dynamic simulations, with the goal of limiting the adversary’s capability to
glean private information from the computation tasks outsourced by the user.

3.3.1

System Model and Threat Model

3.3.1.1

System Model

Local computing

Cloud

Configure and
build the black
box
Disguised
input
Disguised
output

Upload the
blackbox

One-time
Blackbox

Return disguised
output

Recovering
operation
Recovered
Output

Figure 3.1: Ideal system model for secure computation outsourcing
Figure. 3.1 illustrates the conceptual system model, consisting of two entities: the
user and the cloud. The user wishes to outsource to the cloud power system dynamic
simulations with privacy preservation, by uploading a configured black box to the
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cloud. An ideal black box is a piece of executable software that encapsulates all the
information it requires, except for the external input, to complete the computation
while looking “unintelligible” to the cloud. The cloud performs all computations
through the black box. To preserve the privacy of both the input and output values,
the black box is constructed in such as way that it takes protected inputs and produce
protected outputs, which will be recovered by the user later.
As data confidentiality is of the primary interest of this work, we enumerate in
the following the private data involved in a typical dynamic simulation.
• Power System Models: these are the mathematical models, usually nonlinear
differential algebraic equations, of machines and control systems, such as
generators, governors, motor load.
• Model data: the specific parameters and configurations with respective to
power system models, including the bus connectivity and information about
where and when to apply faults. Model data are usually measured, validated
or defined by utility planning engineers.
• Operating conditions of the system: the values of system states at the
beginning of the simulation. They are updated based on the real-time data
from the SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition)/EMS (Energy
Management System) in the control room.
• Simulation results: the output of the contingency simulation in the form of
trajectories of state variables over the simulated time.
Data are divided into two categories: input data and output data. Input data are
defined as the data submitted to the cloud so that the simulation can be conducted
on the cloud end. Output data refer to any information that the simulation produces
as the result of the dynamic simulation. Naturally, all the kinds of data listed above
except for the simulations results belong to the input data. Simulation results are the
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only kind of output data. Both input data and output data are at risk of unauthorized
disclosure if left unprotected.
3.3.1.2

Threat model and security goals

In the threat model, the adversary is semi-honest cloud service provider, who is not
entirely trusted by the user in the sense that the cloud service provider will honestly
carry out the delegated computation tasks and deliver the result of the computations,
but it is curious about the computation happening in the cloud, and may try to
compromise the user’s data privacy by eavesdropping any data stream that flows in
and out of the cloud. The security goal of our work is to limit the adversaries’ ability
to compromise the users’ data confidentiality, which, in this particular context, is
defined as not any private data listed in Section 3.3.1.1 can be gleaned from the data
sent to and produced by the cloud.

3.3.2

Background on Power System Dynamic Simulations

In this section, we briefly review dynamic simulations and use Power System Toolbox
(PST from now on) Chow and Rogers (2000); Chow and Cheung (1992), an MATLABbased open-source simulator, as an example to explain how they work.
3.3.2.1

Dynamic simulations

Dynamic simulation refers to a computer-based approach to study a system’s dynamic
behavior as a function of time Zeigler et al. (2000). The key idea is to describe the
system with a set of mathematical equations, where the variables are the time-varying
states of the system. The dynamic states are obtained by solving the equations over
the simulated time. As the equations are usually nonlinear, for example, ordinary
differential equations or partial differential equations, solving them requires numeric
methods such as Euler method, Runge-Kutta method, trapezoidal method, and so
forth. In the power system research and operations, dynamic simulations are used to
53

simulate the time-varying trajectories of the state variables of a power system, such
as machine speeds, rotor angles, in, under certain initial conditions and disturbances.
3.3.2.2

Power System Dynamic simulations with PST

PST is an open-sourced MATLAB-based software specialized in power system
dynamic simulations. It is developed and maintained by Dr. Joe Chow’s research
group at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. PST was initially developed in 1990s, and
the latest version is PST V.3.0. Designed and developed to be run on single PCs,
PST does not take data privacy into consideration. In spite that, this open-sourced
software serves as a convenient platform for us to apply and test our secure outsourcing
scheme. It is worth noting, however, that our proposed secure outsourcing scheme
is not unique to PST; it is applicable to any power system dynamic simulations
regardless of what simulation software in use.
3.3.2.3

Variable naming convention in the source code

To better explain how to enable security protection by modifying the source code in
later sections, we introduce the following variable naming conventions that are used
by PST source code. First, the variable name of a state variable’s derivative comes
from prefixing a d to the name of the state variable. For example, mac ang denotes
the machine angles while dmac ang denotes their derivatives, i.e. the rates of the
changes of machine angles. Second, variables in the source codes are matrices, as
PST is MATLAB-based. So, we can access elements of a matrix by supplying the
matrix with indices. For example, mac ang(i, j) refers to the element on the ith row
and jth column in the matrix. We can also use mac ang(i, :) to refer the ith row. We
say both mac ang(i, j) and mac ang(i, :) are references to mac ang.
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3.4

Secure Outsourcing Schemes

In this section, we explain how the proposed scheme protects the privacy of both the
input and output data during the outsourcing of dynamic simulations.

3.4.1

Protecting the Simulation Results with the Disguising
Technique

In dynamic simulations, simulation results are the trajectories of state variables. A
trajectory is obtained by calculating the points on it step by step using numeric
integration. The value of a single point is first been by the cloud once it is calculated
even before the simulation concludes. So a trajectory must be protected in such a
way that when a point is calculated out, its exposure to the cloud does not reveal
the point’s real values during and after the simulation to the cloud. To this end,
considering the form of the output data, we adopt the disguising technique to mask the
trajectories while the simulation is still in progress. That is, the original trajectories
are transformed into another form so that their actual values remain secrete to the
cloud. Later, only the one who knows how the transformation can undo the applied
transformation and recover the original trajectories. We elaborate this idea as follows.
3.4.1.1

Using Injective Mappings to Disguise the DAE’s solution

Dynamic simulations, in essence, solve a set of differential-algebraic equations (DAE
from now on) in order to get the trajectories of state variables that describe the
system’s behavior. In order to disguise the trajectories, the original DAEs need to be
transformed accordingly in the first place.
More specifically, DAEs can be generally represented as
F(ẋ(t), x(t), t) = 0
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where x, i.e. , the solution of the DAEs, is a time-varying vector holding n state
variables. To hide the original solution, i.e. , the trajectory x(t), we define an injective
mapping xdisguised (t) → x(t) such that xdisguise (t)+g(t) = x(t), where g are randomly
generated cubic spline functions and ġ is the derivative of g. The disguised DAEs
will then be outsourced instead of the original ones as:
˙
Fdisguised ((xdisguised
(t), xdisguised (t), t) = 0
which is equivalent to:
F(ẋ(t) − ġ(t), x(t) − g(t), t)) = 0
Since g are generated and kept secret by the user, after the cloud returns the disguised
solution xdisguised (t), only the user can recover the original trajectories by computing
x(t) = xdisguised (t) + g(t).
We sketch a proof of the correctness as follows.
Theorem 1. For a pair of original DAE and its transformed version, denoted by
F (ẋ(t), x(t), t) = 0 and F (sm(x˙ 0 (t)), sm(x0 (t)), t) = 0, respectively, where sm(·) is
a secret injective mapping for the x(t), if x0 is the solution of the transformed DAE,
then sm(x0 ) is the solution of the original solution.
Proof. If x0 is the solution of the transformed DAE, then the following equation holds.
F(sm(x0 (t)), sm(x0 (t)), t) = 0
Let x00 = sm(x0 ), substituting sm(x0 ) with x00 , we have
F(ẋ00 , x00 , t) = 0
As we also have the original DAEs F (ẋ(t), x(t), t) = 0, then we may conclude that
x00 is also the solution of the original DAEs.
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3.4.1.2

Choice of Injective Mappings

To achieve the best hiding without incurring too much computational overhead, we
note that the secret injective mapping M should satisfy the a number of properties
summarized as follows.
1. No ambiguity. This property requires that the mapping, F, should be one-onone. That is, given the disguised result, there is only one corresponding original
result.
2. Derivable. The mapping, which intends to replace the initial state variable,
needs to be derivable because it often requires computing a state variable’s
derivative in power system simulations.

Otherwise, singularity may occur,

leading to numerically unstable disguised DAE is not numerically stable. For
this reason, the traditional XOR masking would not help in our case.
3. Random. If the mapping is deterministic or predictable, the adversary can guess
the original result by merely looking at the disguised trajectories, and, thus,
there is no effect of hiding at all. Examples that do not satisfy this property
include adding to the state variable a constant number or a sinusoidal function
of a constant frequency or multiplying the state variable with a deterministic
value.
4. Efficient to evaluate. The outsourcing scheme should not incur much overhead
by evaluating the extra mappings. Otherwise, the outsourcing may require too
much effort on the computation that does not directly relate to the simulation,
and the overall efficiency and economy of outsourcing will suffer.
Inspired by Atallah et al. (2001), we find that adding a well-chosen cubic spline
functions to the original state variables in the DAEs is a suitable choice of secret
injective mapping. Atallah et al. (2001) used cubic spline functions to disguise the
solution of an ordinary differential equation. More specifically, the approach maps
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the initial solution to the addition of the initial solution and a randomly generated
spline function of time defined over the same domain of the initial solution. We adopt
this idea in our design.
A cubic spline function Reinsch (1967), is defined as a piecewise cubic polynomial,
which joins in the knots obeying continuity conditions. Knots refer to as points
where the two neighboring pieces connect. A cubic spline function stipulates that
neighboring parts are continuous at their sharing knot and have the same second and
first order derivative. To obtain a random spline function, we first set a number of
randomly generated knots and then use efficient cubic spline interpolation to connect
these knots.
A well-chosen spline functions can satisfy all properties listed above.
First of all, adding a spline function to the original state variable is a one-onone mapping, so one can always recover the original result by removing the effect of
spline functions from the disguised result without ambiguity. Second, each piece is
a cubic polynomial. Neighboring pieces must have the same second-order derivative,
so, by definition, splines function are differentiable at any point in their domain.
Thirdly, spline functions are based on a large number of randomly generated knots.
A cubic spline function with m knots involves (m + 1 reginons) × (4 parameter per
region) − (m knots) × (3 constraints per knot) = m + 4 parameters. As a result,
in order to determine a cubic spline function with m knots, one needs to guess all
the m + 4 random values. If m is large enough, this will become extremely difficult.
Fourthly, spline functions are highly configurable. We can configure them such that
they have approximately the same range as the original trajectories to ensure the
best disguising effect. Lastly, a spline function comprises of polynomials, which are
efficient to evaluate In our design, by limiting the degree of the spline function to
three, we can achieve small computation overhead.
To illustrate how spline functions are applied to disguise the output data, we take
an exemplary two-area three-generator power system model that can be described
with the following DAEs. Note that, however, in the example, the linear model is
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chosen only for ease of illustration; the disguising technique using well-chosen spline
functions as the injective mapping is also applicable to arbitrary non-linear models,
as described in the last Section 3.4.1.1.
x01 = x4

(3.1)

x02 = x5

(3.2)

x03 = x6

(3.3)

x04 = πf /H1 · (Pm1 − Pe1 )

(3.4)

x05 = πf /H2 · (Pm2 − Pe2 )

(3.5)

x06 = πf /H3 · (Pm3 − Pe3 )

(3.6)

x1 through x6 are state variables. Pmi , Hi , Pmi are obtained from the power flow
P
analysis and Pei = j=1,2,3 Ei Ej Yi,j cos(thi,j − xi + xj ), where Yi,j and thi,j are also
results from power flow analysis. They are considered as invariant during one step of
numerical integration.
First, apply the disguise technique to the state variables, i.e.

let xiD (t) + gi (t) =

xi (t), for i = 1, 2, .., 6, where the subscript D means ‘disguised’ and gi are randomly
generated cubic spline functions. These substitutions give the disguised version as
follows.

x01D + g10 = x4D + g4

(3.7)

x02D + g20 = x5D + g5

(3.8)

x03D + g30 = x6D + g6

(3.9)

x04D + g40 = πf /H1 · (Pm1 − Pe1 )

(3.10)

x05D + g50 = πf /H2 · (Pm2 − Pe2 )

(3.11)

x06D + g60 = πf /H3 · (Pm3 − Pe3 )

(3.12)
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where gi0 is the derivative of the spline function gi and the algorithm can easily
calculate it given the expression of gi . We then outsource the disguised DAEs to
the cloud and let the cloud solve for the disguised trajectories of state variables.
Upon receiving the disguised trajectory, we may obtain the original state variables’
trajectories by applying the secret mapping, as
xi (t) = xiD (t) + gi (t), i = 1, 2...6
3.4.1.3

Implementation of the Disguising Technique Using Spline Functions

To disguise a state variable, it requires replacing all references to the state variable and
all references of state variable’s derivative, with their respective injective mapping,
i.e. adding the corresponding random spline function.
Take the state variable mac spd, a n-by-t matrix denoting the speeds of all
the n machines in the power system over t time instant. To disguise mac spd,
reference like mac spd(i, j), which indicates the n-th machine’s speed at the jth
instant, and mac spd(i, :), which refers to the ith machine’s speed over the simulated
time, are to be replaced by mac spd(i, j) + disg mac spd(i, j), and mac spd(i, :) +
disg mac spd(i, :), respectively. In addition, reference of the state variable’s derivative
like dmac spd(i, j) should be replaced with dmac spd(i, j) + disg dmac spd(i, j).
Here, disg mac spd denotes the spline functions used to disguise mac spd, where the
prefix disg stands for disguising, and disg dmac spd is the derivative of disg mac spd.
In practice, disg mac spd is implemented as a function disg mac spd(k, t) that
takes three parameters: k the machine’s number, and t the time instant.

The

function outputs the value of the k-th spline function at time instant t. Similarly,
disg dmac spd(k, t) outputs derivative of the k-th function in disg mac spd at time
instant t.
More specifically, for example, we replace mac spd(i, :) with mac spd(i, :) +
disg mac spd(i, :) by three steps: 1) extracting the name of the variable, “mac spd”
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and its associated indices, “(i, :)”. 2) adding the disguising prefix to the variable
name to get the name of the disguising term disg mac spd, 3) supplying the same
indices to the disguising term disg mac spd(i, :), and 4) replacing mac spd(i, :)
with mac spd(i, :) + disg mac spd(i, :). The same procedures apply to replacing an
arbitrary state variable and its derivative with their respective disguising terms.
When we try to implement the replacing method, we encounter two problems.
The first is that nested references make it difficult to extract the index. For example,
to extract the indexes in mac spd(get f ault line index(i, :), :), traditional approach
of Regular Expression would fail. The reason is that Regular Expression only linearly
scans the code and extracts anything between a left parenthesis and the first right
parenthesis it scans afterward and ignores the fact that the two parentheses might not
make a pair. In this example, the extracted index, thus, is, get f ault line index(i, :,
which is incomplete and meaningless.
The second problem is that the resulted new source codes after applying the
replacing method may no longer be valid. For example, the initial source code looks
mac spd(:,j) = mac spd(:,k)+h sol * dmac spd(:,k)
After disguising mac spd, it becomes
mac spd(:,j)+disg mac spd(:,j) = mac spd(:,k) + disg mac spd(:,k) + h sol
* ( dmac spd(:,k) + disg dmac spd(:,k))
The newly generated code is no longer valid nor executable since the equal sign
“=” means assigning the value of the right operand to the left operand. However, the
left-hand side of the new code is no longer a variable. In this example, the problem
could be solved by rewriting the new code to:
mac spd(:,j) = -disg mac spd(:,j) + mac spd(:,k) + disg mac spd(:,j) +
h sol *(dmac spd(:,k) + disg dmac spd(:,k)).
Taking both the problems into account, we design a source code modification
algorithm based on parentheses counting and operator recognition. To solve the first
problem, we let the algorithm keep track of matched parentheses and extracts the
outermost pair of parentheses and the contents they enclose. To solve the second
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problem, when an “=” is scanned in the source code, we move all terms but the
original state variable from the left-hand side to the right-hand side. We illustrate
our algorithm in Algorithm. 1, where the symbol “||” means concatenating.

3.4.2

Ensure Input Privacy Through Code Obfuscation

3.4.2.1

Code Obfuscation Basics

In the previous section, we use the injective mapping to mask the output to maintain
the output confidentiality.

However, there is yet nothing so far to prevent the

adversary from peeking into the source codes and discovering where and how the
disguise techniques. In that case, the adversary is free to remove the mask and
recover the initial source code. More importantly, regardless of whether the disguised
technique has been applied to disguise the output, the source code also contains all
the input data discussed in Section 3.3. To overcome this, we propose to make use of
code obfuscation to enhance the security protection of the input data.
Although Barak el al. have proved the theoretical impossibility of implementing
general-purpose obfuscators in Barak et al. (2012), code obfuscators are widely used
in practice for the intellectual property protection. Software vendors who do not want
to share their source codes with others, will only deploy the obfuscated and compiled
software to the end users and make it difficult for reverse engineering and analysis.
The obfuscated software is equivalent to the original one in terms of functionality,
but it deliberately hides implementation details.
Collberg et al. (1997) gives a definition of an obfuscating transformation as follows:
Definition (obfuscating transformation) Let P → P 0 be a transformation of a
source program P into a target program P 0 . P → P 0 is an obfuscating transformation,
if P and P 0 have the same observable behavior. More precisely, in order for P → P 0
to be a valid obfuscating transformation, the following conditions must hold.
• If P fails to terminate or terminates with an error condition, then P 0 may or
may not terminate.
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Data: The source code;
{Vars, dVars} names of state variables and their derivatives to be
disguised
Result: Modified source codes
forall the S in {Vars, dVars} do
forall the occurrences of “S(” in the source code do
Initialize character current character ← the character next to “S(”;
Initialize integer unmatched parenthesis ← 1;
Initialize character start of indices ← current character;
while unmatched parenthesis is not 0 do
if current character is “(” then
increment unmatched parenthesis;
if current character is “)” then
decrement unmatched parenthesis
move current character to the next;
end
Initialize character end of indices ← current character ;
Initialize character string indices ← substring between start of indice
and end of indice (inclusive);
/* determine if the current reference is on the left-hand
side of a equals sign (‘‘=’’)
*/
current character ← the next character after end of indices;
Initialize character operator ← current character;
/* Initialize the string to replace the original reference
*/
Initialize character string rep str ← an empty string;
if operator equals “=” then
rep str ← S||indices||“ = −disg 00 ||S||indices;
replace the reference with rep str
else
rep str ← “(”||S||indices||“ + disg 00 ||S|indices||“)”;
replace original S||indices with rep str;
end
end
end
Algorithm 1: Source code modification algorithm
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• Otherwise, P 0 must terminate and produce the same output as P.
Various obfuscation techniques have been proposed and used in reality. These
include layout transformation, control transformation, ordering transformation. They
have different level of potency and can be applied independently. We refer the reader
to Collberg et al. (1997) for more details on code obfuscation.
In our implementation, we use MATLAB’s pcode functionality as a surrogate of the
general-purpose code obfuscator. The pcode functionality is provided in MATLAB.
It takes the MATLAB source code and transforms it into the preparsed and encoded
version, so the resulting code becomes intelligible but works the same as the original
code. Apparently, the pcode satisfies the definition of code obfuscation. Note that
pcode is used here to represent the general obfuscation process. More sophisticated
and secure obfuscations can be chosen depending on the level of protection. To our
best knowledge, there is not yet any known active attack against the pcode.

3.4.3

Framework

By now, we can summarize our scheme by introducing as follows the framework of
our proposed scheme.
• SplineGen(n, nk , tstart , tend , Restimate ) → Φ. This is a randomized algorithm that
takes as input, n, the number of state variables to disguised, nk the number of
knots for each spline function, tstart , tend , the starting and ending time of the
simulation, and Restimate the estimate range of the state variables. It outputs
the splines functions for the n state variables and stored spline functions in Φ.
A spline function is obtained by first randomly generating the knots , and then
connecting the knots by Lagrange interpolation.
• SplineEva(Φ, k, t) This function evaluates the k-th spline function in Φ at the
time instant t, where t ∈ [tstart , tend ], and returns the value.
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• ProbEnc(Φ, Ψ) → Ψ0 This function takes as input Ψ the original problem in the
form of simulation source code, as well as Φ, the spline functions generated by
SplineGen. The function applies disguising technique to all the state variables to
be protected. Afterward, it performs code obfuscation on the modified source
code to generate the encrypted simulation source code, what is the output of
Ψ0 .
• SimulationExec(Ψ0 ) → Sdisguise . This function executes the a feThis function
takes as input an encrypted simulation, performs the encrypted simulation,
and produces the disguised simulation result Sdisguise , by solving the disguised
DAEs.
• ResultRec(Sdisguise , Φ) → S This function takes as input Sdisguise the disguised
trajectories, Φ the spline functions used to disguise the original state variables.
It recovers the original trajectories by adding together the point on the disguised
trajectories and its corresponding masking values, which are obtained by calling
SplineEva.
In accordance with the system model illustrated in Section 3.3.1.1, The user
performs SplineGen and ProbEnc to produce the encrypted simulator. It then uploads
the encrypted problem to the cloud. The cloud performs SimulationExec(Ψ0 ) and
returns the disguised trajectories to the user. Finally, the user calls ResultRec to
recover the right trajectories from the disguise ones.

3.4.4

Experiment Results

We implemented our secure outsourcing scheme and tested whether the scheme would
hide the simulation output data and whether we can recover the original trajectories
from the disguised ones. As a cloud computing application, our implementation
involves two parts: the cloud end and the client end. The cloud end is a service
running in the cloud that receives and executes MATLAB codes sent from the client
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Figure 3.2: Client side UI for secure outsourcing of dynamic simulations
Left half is the “Disguising and obfuscating” component, which is responsible for
processing the source code to protect the input data confidentiality before uploading
the source code. The right half is responsible for recovering the disguised trajectory
received back from the cloud.
side and returns the result back upon completion. The client end consists of the
source code modifier and code obfuscator. Source code modifier is a python program
that first inserts the codes responsible for generating disguising spline functions to
the original source code and then runs Algorithm.1. The code obfuscator makes use
of the pcode function to obfuscate the modified source code. Fig. 3.2 illustrates the
user interface of the client software.
To demonstrate the correctness of our scheme, we tested it on the NPCC 48machine, 140-bus power system model. The model represents the backbone system
of the northeast region of the North American East Interconnection.
Figure. 3.3 delineates the original (unmasked), disguised (masked), and recovered
trajectories of the generators’ angles and speeds. It is shown that the original and
the recovered trajectories are identical. Taking the difference of the two, which is a
zero vector, verifies our observation. By that, the outsourcing scheme can disguise
the original result and also recover the disguised result without any error.
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Figure 3.3: Original, disguised, and recovered curves of machine angles and machine
speeds

3.5

Performance analysis

We base our analysis on the following settings.
• The simulation to in involves N state variables and s time steps.
• The original simulator uses the fixed time step trapezoidal method for numerical
integration, which is also commonly used by default in most commercial
dynamic simulation software packages like PSS/E according to Fu (2011).
• Each spline function contains k random knots.
• Evaluating a spline function at a certain point is of constant complexity.
• Disguising one state variable in the source code is of constant complexity.
• Obfuscating a program with a code obfuscator is of constant complexity.
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3.5.0.1

Local End Overhead

The local end performs SplineGen, ProbEnc, ResultRec. Based on our assumptions,
in Big-O notations, the complexity of ProbEnc is O(N ) since it handle N state
variables, with each taking constant time; SplineGen is also of O(N k) complexity
since it generates a spine function for N state variables. Each requires Lagrange
interpolation over k knots, which is of O(k). ResultRec is O(N s), as it needs to
recover N state variables’ trajectories, and each of the trajectories is s long. Overall,
the local overhead is of O(N k + N + N s) = O(N s) complexity, as s >> k. As
seen, the complexity is independent of the complexities of power system models of
the power system.
3.5.0.2

Cloud End Overhead

The computational cost that is pertaining to solving DAEs dominates the computational overhead in the cloud end. With fixed-step trapezoidal method, the per
step complexity to calculate all the N state variables is given by O(N ρ), where ρ
indicates the average complexity of evaluating the functions of state variables in the
power system model. Accordingly, the complexity required by solving for the N state
variables’ trajectories over s time steps is O(N sρ). With massive and complex system
models, i.e. a large ρ, the computation complexity of the cloud end is enormous and
unpredictable.
Without outsourcing, the complexity O(N sρ) will be undertaken by the user
with their limited computation resources. In contrast, thanks to outsourcing, this
computation burden will be migrated to the cloud, which possesses much more
powerful computing capabilities to speed up the computation, leaving the local end
with the much smaller and a predictable complexity of O(N s). As a result, users
will not spend more time to outsource the simulation to the cloud than conducting
the simulation on their own. By that, with the proposed secure outsourcing scheme,
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users can expect to have savings on great local computation and time savings by
outsourcing while preserving the privacy of both input and output data.

3.6

Discussions

We understand that code obfuscation used in our scheme has its limitation in that
given enough time, and resources, a determined adversary will be able to reverse
engineer any computer program protected by code obfuscation. However, we argue
that, if properly used and with the advances in code obfuscation techniques, code
obfuscation can still build up a strong defense against potential privacy breaches
during the course of computation outsourcing. Also, the privacy protection can be
further fortified by using the proposed secure outsourcing scheme in tandem with
other higher-level strategies.
First, the software industry has been leveraging code obfuscation for the purpose
of the intellectual property protection Collberg et al. (1997). As a typical tactic,
if reverse engineering the current version of a software program takes even more
efforts and time than developing a new and more advanced version, the value of
reverse engineer is mostly diminished. Likewise, in power system dynamic simulation,
information such as the transient state of the power system, although sensitive, expires
in a short period after the contingency gets resolved. Hence, the same logic applies
here. As long as code obfuscation technique can thwart the reverse engineering before
the sensitive information expires, we consider that our scheme successfully defends
against the attack. In fact, code obfuscation does show great usefulness when it
comes to stalling the attacker. According to Collberg et al. Collberg et al. (1997), it
is viable to apply obfuscating transformations in polynomial time but remove them
in exponential time. Mariano et al. Ceccato and Penta (2009) reported that, by
just using identifier renaming, it significantly decreased the efficiency of attackers,
at least doubling the time needed to complete a successful attack even against the
best attacker. Wroblewski (2002) conducted empirical studies that drew a similar
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conclusion that it is possible to provide an empirically full protection of the source
code by code obfuscation. Concretely, it takes 100 experienced crackers to work a year,
4 hours per day, to understand the meaning of a compiled and obfuscated program
that contains 1,400,000 to 70,000,000 instructions and are protected by the opaque
construct technique. Linn and Debray (2003) states that the best commercially
available disassembly tool fails to disassemble correctly over 65% of the instructions,
and 85% of the codes obfuscated with their obfuscation technique.
Secondly, as stated earlier, note that the code obfuscation we used in this
work serves as a surrogate of the secure general-purpose software obfuscation.
General-purpose software obfuscation aims at making any software under protection
”unintelligible” while ensuring it is functionally equivalent to the original software.
Recent researches on general-purpose obfuscation, such as Garg et al. (2013), Sahai
and Waters (2013), and Barak et al. (2014), have achieved a series of progresses.
With Garg et al. (2013), Sanjam et al. constructed a candidate indistinguishability
obfuscator for all polynomial-size circuits, using both Multilinear Jigsaw Puzzles
and fully homomorphic encryption Gentry (2009). As suggested by this work, this
approach could finally evolve to a general-purpose black box obfuscation for an
arbitrary program, by determining the classes of amenable functions to their scheme.
When the general-purpose secure obfuscation becomes mature and ready for practical
uses, we can quickly replace pcode employed above in the dissertation with provablesecure obfuscation without changing the system model illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
Last but not least, incorporating other non-cryptographic strategies is also helpful
to increase the strength of protection. For example, to privately evaluate the product
of two matrices without revealing the matrices, Protocol 2 in Du and Atallah (2001)
proposes to hide the authentic matrix in an enormous number of similar matrices. In
a similar fashion, we can hide the authentic simulation among a batch of randomly
generated bogus but similar simulations. In order for a successful attack, the attacker
will need to analyze all of the outsourced simulations, which significantly raises the
difficulty to launch an attack.
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Chapter 4
Privacy-preserving Spectral
Estimation of PMU Data for the
Monitoring of Inter-area
Oscillations
4.1

Introduction

Inter-area oscillations are detrimental to the stability of the power transmission grids.
Poorly damped oscillations reduce the capability of the power transfers and even lead
to widespread blackouts. Incidents such as Western Interconnection Blackout on Aug.
10 (1996), US Blackout on Aug. 14 (2003), Italian Blackout on Sept. 28 (2003) have
demonstrated the serious damages that inter-area oscillation can make. Therefore,
in order to keep the lights on, it would be very helpful to continuously track the
oscillation conditions and provide the control room with early warnings before a
potential oscillation develop into a real catastrophic inter-area oscillation.
Recently, using real-time measurement data collected by ambient phasor measurement units (PMU) to monitor and analyze the inter-area oscillations has been
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shown effective. As one of the key enabling technology for the smart grid, PMU
technology, a.k.a, synchrophasor technology makes real-time monitoring of power
systems possible. The data collected by PMUs include instant voltage, current, rotor
angle, and frequency. PMU measurement data have been utilized to 1) support
real-time grid operations, 2) improve system planning and analysis, and, 3) responsebased control applications North America Electric Reliability Corporation, NERC
(2011). When it comes to the study of inter-area oscillations, or more broadly lowfrequency oscillations, a host of research Sun et al. (2012); Vanfretti et al. (2013);
Chakrabarti et al. (2009) use ambient PMU measurements and apply frequency
domain approaches to monitor, detect, and analyze oscillations. The basic idea is
to monitor the frequency domain of PMU measurements, and using methods such
as Frequency Domain Decomposition (FDD) Brincker et al. (2000, 2001), computing
risk scores Sun et al. (2012), or tracking the oscillation modes Vanfretti et al. (2013),
so that useful information and more insights about the oscillations can be acquired.
For these frequency domain approaches, the spectral estimation is the starting
point.

To obtain spectral estimations, we note that existing frequency domain

approaches all assume they have unrestricted access to all the measurement data
of the ambient PMUs. Nonetheless, privacy concerns regarding the use of PMU
measurement data exist in real practice. In the current deregulated power market,
the transmission grid comprises competing utility companies running their own power
systems under the coordination of independent system operator (ISO). The utility
companies consider the PMU measurements taken at their own power system private
and sensitive, as North American Electricity Reliability Corporation Confidentiality
Agreement for Electric System Operating Reliability Data North American Electric
Reliability Corperation (2009) points out that “the operational reliability data may
contain proprietary information and unequal access to operational reliability data
may result in unfair advantages and disadvantages in the electricity market”. In
fact, according to EIOC (2013), “Since deregulation, a competitive environment has
arisen and complete information about the state of the power grid is seldom available
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to operators”. Although legal agreements like North American Electric Reliability
Corperation (2009) exist to try to ensure the privacy of sensitive data during their
use in research and operations, there are no technical guarantees. As a consequence, in
spite of benefits, the lack of privacy protection seriously discourages utility companies
from sharing their data.
Our contributions In this work, we take the first step to investigate privacypreserving multiparty spectral estimations to demonstrate the feasibility to conduct
spectral estimation without losing data privacy.

We address this open problem

mainly leveraging the cloud computing and Paillier cryptosystem Paillier (1999).
The main idea of the proposed scheme is to let each utility encrypt their PMU
measurements; leveraging the additive homomorphism of the Paillier cryptosystem,
the cloud performs Fourier transform directly over the encrypted measurement data
without the need to decrypt for the original data. The cloud then sends the result of
the privacy preserving spectral estimation, i.e. the encrypted spectrum estimation
in the form of encrypted frequency coefficients, to the operator in the control room.
The operator uses the private key to decrypt for all the encrypted coefficients.
Besides privacy losses caused by unauthorized disclosure of the measurement
data in the time domain, there also exist data privacy concerns in the frequency
domain. The spectrum in the frequency range of the inter-area oscillation should
be disclosed to the operator for monitoring purpose. The spectrum beyond the
inter-area oscillation frequency range may contain information that is irrelevant to
the inter-area oscillations, but still useful to participating parties other than the
operator. Accordingly, it is desirable to have a mechanism to enforce access control
in the frequency domain to grant access to a particular frequency range to designated
parties. Later, we will explain how the proposed scheme achieves this feature by
utilizing random masks.
Note that while the proposed scheme in this chapter is based on the discrete
Fourier transform (DFT), it can also be adapted to more sophisticated Fourier-based
power spectral estimations such as Welch method, multitaper method, etc, in a similar
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way. Neither the application of privacy preserving spectrum estimation is limited
to monitoring the power grid; it can also be applied to any other areas involving
frequency domain analyses of sensitive data such as health care, consumer behavior
analysis, etc.
Our contribution is summarized as follows:
• To our best knowledge, for the first time, this work considers the privacy
preserving spectral estimation in the multiparty scenario.
• The proposed scheme not only preserves the participants’ privacy in the input
data in the time domain but also achieves fine-grained access control in the
frequency domain.
• Software prototype of the proposed scheme is developed and tested. Taking
into account the characteristics of spectral estimations in the power grid,
effective optimization are proposed to reduce the latency incurred by the extra
cryptographic computations, and, thus, make the proposed method even more
practical.
We organize the rest of this chapter as follows. Section.4.2 reviews the related
works. Section.4.3 talks about the background knowledge. Section.4.4 first introduces
settings and system model and formulates the problem we would like to solve.
The section continues to presents the proposed scheme and discusses optimization
techniques that make the proposed scheme more efficient. Section.4.5 carries out
the security analysis. Section.4.6 covers the complexity analysis with respective to
the communication and computation overheads. Section.4.7 presents the experiment
results of our proposed scheme under stress testings and the a test with the a simplified
model of WECC AC transmission system.
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4.2

Related Works

Our work falls into the broad category of non-interactive privacy-preserving signal
processing. Although, to our best knowledge, our proposed scheme is the first to
deal with privacy-preserving spectral estimations involving multiple parties, we have
drawn significant inspiration from the previous research. The most closely related
work is Bianchi et al. (2009) by Bianchi et al. , which demonstrates the feasibility
of carrying out Fourier transform in the encrypted domain. Lagendijk et al. (2013)
survey existing privacy-preserving signal processing utilizing homomorphic encryption
and secure multiparty computation. Both the works above, however, deal with only
the minimal scenario where a single party wishes to offload the computation to an
untrusted processing device. Additionally, no access control over the output data is
considered.
Our scheme aims at addressing utility companies’ privacy concerns in smart
grid monitoring; previous researches on privacy preservation in smart grid, however,
mainly focus on the privacy of customer data. Shi et al. Elaine Shi et al. (2011)
proposes a scheme that enables privacy-preserving aggregation residential power
consumption on a untrusted aggregator. This scheme only works for aggregation of
encrypted data. Similar problems are also investigated regarding consumers’ privacy
protection in Borges et al. (2014); Thoma et al. (2013); Baharlouei and Hashemi
(2014). A very few existing works consider the data privacy problem of operational
data in the bulk power system. Tong et al. presents a secure data sharing scheme for
situational awareness for the power grid in Tong et al. (2013). It is, however, limited
to secure data archiving and access control for the power flow data; the processing
and manipulation of the shared data still need to be conducted in a fully trusted
environment.
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4.3

Preliminaries

4.3.1

Fourier Transform

Fourier transform is a widely-used fundamental signal processing tool to obtain the
spectral estimation of a signal. An M -point discrete Fourier transform (DFT) of a
finite time-series signal x(n) of length T is given by:

X(k) =

T
X

x(n)W nk , k = 1, 2, ..., M

n=1
j2π

where W = e− M .

The X(k) is a complex number that indicates the signal’s

magnitude and angle in the k-th frequency component. In the rest of the chapter,
unless otherwise stated, we assume M = T , which is a typical choice without loss of
generality.

4.3.2

Paillier Cryptosystem

Paillier cryptosystem Paillier (1999) is based on the decisional composite residuosity
assumption. Paillier cryptosystem is widely known as an additive homomorphic
cryptography. It enables one to compute the encryption of the sum of two value,
say m1 + m2 , given only the encryptions of m1 and m2 , without the need to decrypt
for the values. We briefly revisit Paillier cryptosystem in this subsection.
Key Generation Let p and q be big prime numbers and N = pq , such that
N is hard to factorize. Let the private key be the least common multiple of
(p − 1, q − 1), i.e. ,Kpriv = lcm(p − 1, q − 1). Let g ∈ Z∗N 2 an element of order
αN for some α 6= 0. The public key is the tuple (N, g).
Encryption To encrypt a value m, where m < N , generate a random value r <
N , and use the public key to encrypt the value. The ciphertext is constructed
as: c = Enc(Kpub , m) = g m rN mod N 2 .
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Decryption Given the ciphertext ct, one can decrypt for the plaintext with
the private key, as
m = Dec(Kpriv , ct) =
where L(x) =

L(cKpriv
L(g Kpriv

mod N 2 )
mod N 2 )

mod N

x−1
.
N

Additive homomorphism Given the ciphertext of m1 and m2 , which are
g m1 r1N and g m2 r2N , respectively, one can compute the ciphertext of m1 + m2 .
Enc(Kpub , m1 )Enc(Kpub , m2 ) = g m1 +m2 (r1 r2 )N
= Enc(Kpub , (m1 + m2 )) (4.1)
Enc(Kpub , m1 + m2 ) can be decrypted with the same private key that is used
to encrypt m1 and m2 .
Homomorphic multiplication of plaintext Given the ciphertext g m rN , one
can also calculate the ciphertext of θm, where θ is a constant number, by
computing
(g m rN )θ = g βm (rθ )N = Enc(Kpub , θm)

4.3.3

Monitoring Oscillation in Power System

Figure. 4.1 depicts the classical two area power system introduced in Kundur et al.
(1994) with two generators in each area. Inter-area oscillations may develop at the
interface 12-34. That is between the generator cluster C1, consisting of generators G1
and G2, and the generator cluster C2, consisting of generators G3 and G4. Assume
that the PMUs installed at the respective generators monitor the generators’ rotor
angles. Then, potential oscillations can be monitored and analyzed by continuous
tracking the spectra of the averaged angles of the two areas.
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Figure 4.1: Two area four generator power system from Kundur et al. (1994)
We denote the time series of rotor angles of the four generator as δ1 , δ2 , δ3 , and
δ4 , respectively. The angle of Area 1 is represented by the averaged rotor angle of the
two generators in the area, i.e. δI = 21 (δ1 + δ2 ). Similarly, the angle of Area 2 is given
by δII = 12 (δ3 + δ4 ). Thereby, what we would like to monitor is the spectrum of δ̃I
and δ̃II , where δ̃ = δ − mean(δ) denote the mean centering δ.

4.4

Our Proposed Scheme

4.4.1

Problem Formulation

4.4.1.1

System Model and Entities

The system model of the proposed scheme is captured in Fig. 4.2. Each participating
utility has several PMUs reporting their real-time measurements of rotor angles to
the cloud servers. Since the PMU measurement data must be protected against
unauthorized access of peer utility companies, cloud servers, and the control room,
each PMU sends to the cloud servers the measurement data in their encrypted form.
Next, the cloud servers receive the encrypted measurements and perform relevant
computations to securely obtain the encrypted spectrum estimation without knowing
the real values of the input data. The cloud then forwards the encrypted spectrum to
the control room. Finally, the operator at the control room receives and decrypts the
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Figure 4.2: System Model of privacy-preserving processing of PMU data
spectrum. There also exists secure communication channels between utility companies
and the control room for key assignments and other communications.
We justify the introduction of the public cloud with following arguments. First,
it has been observed a remarkable trend for the power industry to take advantage
of cloud computing to cope with the soaring volumes of data generated and the
responding rapidly growing demand for computing capability. Using the service of
Cloudera, the cloud computing company, TVA began to manage the large volume
of data collected from 103 PMUs (as of 2009), for better reliability and scalability
Bisciglia (2009).

Additionally, ISO New England started to explore leveraging

cloud computing to conduct dynamic simulations not only faster but also less
expensive ISO New England (2014); Litvinov (2014). Second, the cloud has abundant
computational resources so that it can handle the substantial computation incurred by
the cryptographic operations in the privacy-preserving scheme within an acceptable
latency. Finally, by letting the control room hold only the decryption key, but not
the encrypted measurement data, which is only accessible to the cloud, the system
model prevents the control room from abusing the privilege of decryption.
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4.4.1.2

Trust Model and Security Goals

In the above system model, the public cloud servers are modeled as semi-honest.
It means that the cloud is legally obligated to follow the pre-defined protocol
specifications strictly and to conduct the computation correctly, but it will inevitably
look at the information sent in and out.
It is also desirable to restrict the access privilege of the control room in the
frequency domain. For the sole purpose of monitoring inter-area oscillations, the
control room needs only the spectral estimation on a certain frequency range say
[0.1, 0.7] Hz, as inter-area oscillations happen in this range Kundur et al. (1994). The
rest frequency ranges, especially, higher frequency components are more related to
the local events and, thus, are supposed to be protected and released to only the
concerned parties.
Our scheme also assumes that the cloud and the control room does not collude.
With the assumptions as mentioned above, the security goal of our system is
two-fold:
1. to ensure none of the data sent by individual utility will be disclosed to any
parties other than the data owner itself.
2. only the spectrum on the authorized frequency range is disclosed to the control
room.

4.4.2

Monitoring Inter-area Oscillations

Our proposed scheme adopts the framework of Sun et al. (2012) and consists of two
phases, namely, offline analysis and online monitoring.
The offline analysis is similar to that of Sun et al. (2012). This stage aims at
simplifying the power system model by aggregating generators into clusters that may
oscillate against each other. The aggregation can be done with generator coherency
identification methods such as 1) Tolerance base method and 2) Weak Links Based
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Method, according to Sun et al. (2012). The offline analysis does not require sensitive
real-time measurements and, thus, can be conducted beforehand without privacy
concerns.
The online monitoring phase estimates the spectrum of each cluster’s angle. To
this end, it is assumed that each cluster has several PMUs installed to monitor the
rotor angles of the generators in the cluster. A cluster’s angle is given by the average
of the angles reported by PMUs belonging to that cluster.
To be more specific, we use δC1 through δCK to denote the averaged rotor angles
of Custer 1 through K; we also use δCki to denote the rotor angles reported by the
P|Ck|
1
i-th PMU in the k-th cluster. Thus, δCk = |Ck|
i=1 δCki , where |Ck| is the number
of PMUs in Cluster k. Without having any security considerations, the control room
can get the spectral estimation of the angle of cluster k at time t, denoted by FδCk (kω ),
for kω = 0, 1, 2, ..., N . by the following procedures. 1) first having all the PMUs in the
k report their measurements of rotor angles denoted by δCki for {i = 1, 2, ..., |Ck|}, 2)
P|Ck|
1
compute the clusters’ angle as δCk = |Ck|
i=1 δCki , 3) applying Fourier transform to
the mean centering cluster angle δ̃Ck = δCk − hδCk i, where hδCk i is the iterative mean
of δCk . hδCk i is updated as hδCk (t)i =

t−1
hδCk (t − 1)i + 1t δCk (t),
t

as the time advances.

In what follows, we present the proposed privacy preserving multiparty spectrum
estimation that allows for secure calculation of FδCk (kω ) without the knowing the
values of δCki .

4.4.3

Privacy Preserving Multiparty Spectral Estimation

The basic idea is to secure each procedure of the above non-privacy-preserving
approach using the homomorphic encryption.
Setup Once the online monitoring is activated, all the concerned parties make
agreements on T , the length of the time window and, N , the number of points of
the DFT (T = N assumed), fP M U , PMU’s sampling rate, fspec , the frequency to
conduct spectral estimation, [f0 , f1 ], the frequency range authorized to the operator.
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Upon successful agreement, the control room is notified to invoke procedures of cloudassisted multiparty privacy-preserving spectrum estimation.
Key Generation The operator at the control room initializes the Paillier
cryptosystem as described in Section 4.3.2. The operator keeps the private key to
itself and assigns the public key to the cloud as well as all the participating utilities.
In reality, a utility may have more than one PMUs contributing. However, for ease
of presentation, we assume that each utility have only one PMU taking part in the
multiparty spectral estimation.
Uploading Encrypted Input and Random Masks For every

1
fspec

second,

each PMU encrypts their new measurement data using the public key. For example,
the i-th utility in the Cluster k encrypts its measurements δCki as E(δCki ) =
{E(δCki (t)} for i = 0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1, where E(·) is a shorthand of E(Kpub , ·) hereafter,
if there is no confusion.
Besides protecting the privacy in the input data, the proposed scheme also uses
random masks to realize the access control in the frequency domain.

Suppose

according to the agreement in the setup phase, the {kω1 , kω2 , ..., kωn }-th frequency
coefficients are the frequency coefficients corresponding to [f0 , f1 ]. For every frequency
coefficient, each utility (PMU) generates a random complex number to obscure the
coefficient jointly. For example, Utility A generates a mask array rA where rA (kω ) = 0
if k ∈ {kω1 , kω2 , ..., kωn }, and rA (kω ) is a random value if otherwise. All utilities
involved with cluster k generate and encrypt their random masks using Algorithm
4. The utilities then send the encrypted random masks along with the encrypted
measurement data to the cloud in order to let the cloud obscure the spectrum in the
way described in Algorithm 2.
Privacy Preserving Spectrum Estimation Now using the data received
from PMUs, the cloud securely estimates the latest spectrum by applying privacypreserving Fourier transform to the data of the most recent time window for each
cluster. Algorithm 2 details the privacy-preserving Fourier transform. The algorithm
first securely derives the averaged angle of a cluster in the time window. It then
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securely calculates the corresponding iterative mean of the cluster’s angle and mean
centering cluster angle. Finally, the algorithm applies privacy-preserving discrete
Fourier transform to the mean centering cluster angle gives the encrypted spectral
estimation. Algorithm 2. calls three supporting sub-algorithm i.e. Algorithm 3,
4, and 5. Since all computations are carried out in the encrypted domain, so no
information about the measurement data is leaked to the cloud.
Result Decryption The operator at control room receives encrypted frequency
coefficients as a result of Algorithm 2 from the cloud. It then decrypts for the
frequency coefficients using decryption method of Paillier cryptosystem with the
private key. Upon decrypting all coefficients corresponding to [fO1 , fO2 ], the control
room obtains the spectrum estimation of the authorized frequency range of the latest
time window. The spectrum estimation is then used for visualization, monitoring,
or other frequency domain approaches. For unauthorized frequency range outside
[fO1 , fO2 ], the decryption results are frequency coefficients masked with random
P
values, i.e. SCk (kω ) = FCk (kω ) + rCk (kω ), where rCk = |Ck|
i=1 rCki is sum of random
masks of all concerned utilities in Cluster k.
Here the underlying access control policy means that only frequency coefficients
corresponding to [fO1 , fO2 ] is accessible to the control room, while all other obscured
coefficients are useless without knowing all the added random masks, so that no
party may access them. Nevertheless, this is only one of many access control policies
that can be applied. In other cases, if the spectrum of a particular frequency range
outside [fO1 , fO2 ] contains useful information to a utility, say Utility A, the proposed
scheme enables disclosing that part of the spectrum to A. To do so, during the setup
phase, Utility A claims the frequency range, if agreed, other utilities just turn off
their respective random mask on that range such that SCk (kω ) = FCk (kω ) + rA (kω )
holds for the claimed frequency range. Consequently, after receiving from the control
room the decrypted but still obscured SCk (kω ), A can learn the real FCk (kω ) over the
claimed frequency range.
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Data: E(δCki ), E(ri (kω )) for i = 1, 2, ..., |Ck|, t = 0, 1, 2, ..., T − 1,
kω ∈ {0, 1, 2, ..., N − 1};
T Length of the time window, N = T ;
|Ck| Number of generator in the cluster;
τ the running counter of measurements in all past spectral estimations;
Result: Encrypted and masked frequency coefficients E(SCk ) where
SCk (kω ) = FCk (kω ) + r(kω )
Initialize Spectrum an zero-initialized vector of length N ;
/* Homomorphically compute the averaged rotor angle of cluster k
*/
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
P
Q|Ck|
E( |Ck|
i=1 δCki (t)) =
i=1 E(δCki (t));
P
1
E(δCk (t)) = E( |Ck| ∗ Ck
i=1 δCki (t))
end
/* Obtain the mean centering cluster angles
*/
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
/* Calculate the iterative means of δCk within the past second.
and τ1 are constant and can be multiplied
Note that τ +t−1
t
with ciphertexts
*/
τ +t−1
1
E(hδCk (τ + t)i) = E( t hδCk (τ + t − 1)i + τ δCk (t)) ;
/* using
Algorithm 3 and 5 */
/* Get mean center δCk
*/
E(δ̃Ck (t)) = E(δCk (t) − hδCk (t)i) ;
/* using Algorithm 3 */
end
/* Securely apply N -point DFT to δ̃Ck
*/
for kω = 0 to N − 1 do
/* Homomorphically sum up the encrypted random masks from all
PMUs in cluster k
*/
P|Ck|
/* using Algorithm 3 */
E(rCk ) = E( i=1 rCki ) ;
Spectrum[kω ] ← E(rCk );
for t = 0 to T − 1 do
/* Calculate the respective element in the DFT matrix
*/
ω tπ
− j2kM
tkω
Wtkω = W
=e
;
Securely calculate E(δ̃Ck (t) ∗ Wtkω ) ;
/* using Algorithm 5 */
/* Securely accumulate the result to Spectrum[kω ]
*/
Spectrum[kω ] = Spectrum[kω ] · E(δ̃Ck (t) ∗ Wtkω )
end
end
return Spectrum
Algorithm 2: Privacy preserving spectral estimation of the angle of a generator
cluster
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Data: Encrypted complex numbers (E(Areal ), E(Aimg )) and
(E(Breal ), E(Bimg ))
Result: Encrypted sum or difference of A and B,
(E(Areal ± Breal ), E(Aimg ± Bimg )
if to return the addition then
return (E(Areal )E(Breal ), E(Aimg )E(Bimg )
end
else if to return difference then
return (E(Areal )(E(Breal )−1 mod N ), E(Aimg )(E(Bimg )−1 mod N ))
end
Algorithm 3: Secure addition and subtraction of complex numbers

Data: a complex number a + bi;
Public key of the Paillier cryptosystem (g, N )
Result: Encryption of a complex number
/* Use the encryption method in Paillier cryptosystem to encrypt
the real and imaginary part, respectively
*/
N
mod N ;
E(a) ← g a rR
E(b) ← g b rIN mod N ;
return (E(a), E(b))
Algorithm 4: Encryption of a complex number

Data: An encrypted complex number (E(a), E(b));
An constant complex number c + di;
Result: Encryption of the complex number (a + bi)(b + ci)
encP rodR = E(a)b (E(b)c )−1 mod N 2 ) ;
/* get the real part */
c
d
2
encP rodI = E(a) (E(b) mod N ) ;
/* get the imaginary part */
return (encP rodR , encP rodI )
Algorithm 5: Multiply a encrypted complex number with a constant complex
number
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4.4.4

Optimization

Algorithm 1. can be optimized in following ways to improve its efficiency.
Precompute DFT matrix Once parameters T and N are chosen, the DFT
matrix, i.e. Wtkω for t ∈ 1, 2, ..., T and kω ∈ 1, 2, ..., N are also fixed. Therefore,
instead of computing the elements in the DFT matrix on the fly, precomputing the
DFT matrix before the runtime and building a lookup table can reduce the execution
time of the algorithm.
Compute only selected frequency coefficients To monitor inter-area oscillation, it suffices to perform the spectral estimation over only the frequency range
of [0.1, 0.7] Hz. Likewise, to monitor low-frequency oscillation, it suffices to only
estimate the spectrum over the frequency range of [0.1, 2] Hz. Computing only the
necessary frequency coefficients, instead of the whole spectrum, will save computation
efforts and reduce execution latency.
Parallelizing The encrypted frequency coefficients are independently calculated
in Algorithm 2. As a result, it is possible to parallelize the computation by having a
number of machines independently computing subsets of the frequency coefficients at
the same time. For example, if ten machines are employed, each machine can compute
tenth of the all encrypted coefficients In fact, with the good scalability, the cloud is
very suitable and convenient to set up and carry out such parallel computations.
In Section 4.7, experiment results show that the optimization techniques improve
the performance of the algorithm by orders of magnitude.

4.5

Security Analysis

We analyze the security of the proposed scheme in a bottom-up approach. To this
end, we first analyze the security of Algorithm 4, Algorithm 3, and Algorithm 5, and,
lastly, Algorithm 2.
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Security of Algorithm 4 Algorithm 4 is semantically secure as long as the
underlying Paillier cryptosystem is secure under decisional composite residuosity
assumption Paillier (1999), as this algorithm only encrypts two independent integers.
Security of Algorithm 3 Algorithm 3 is semantically secure guaranteed by the
security of additive homomorphic property of Paillier cryptosystem.
Security of Algorithm 5 Algorithm 5 is semantically secure as relies on the Paillier
cryptosystem’s homomorphic multiplication between a ciphertext and plaintext,
which is known to be secure as well as Algorithm 3, which is also semantically secure.
Security of Algorithm 2 Algorithm 2 is semantically secure, because the algorithm
only calls Algorithm 5 and Algorithm 3 and does not include other computations.
Both the called algorithm are semantically secure by our analysis.
By now, the security goals of the scheme are met. First, for any participating
utility company, its peer utility companies cannot get the original measurement data it
shares for the monitoring purpose, because the measurement data are sent to the cloud
while they are encrypted with the public key. Second, the cloud will learn neither the
value of measurement data, any intermediate result nor the final spectrum because
all computations are carried out in the encrypted domain. Finally, the access control
in the frequency domain is effective because unauthorized frequency coefficients are
securely obscured, so the control center can only access the spectrum of the authorized
frequency ranges.

4.6

Complexity Analysis

For ease of presentation, we use notations Table 4.1 in the analyses.

4.6.1

Complexity Analysis

In this section, we analyze the computation and communication complexities of
the proposed privacy-preserving scheme.
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Following a bottom-up approach, we

Table 4.1: Notations used in the the complexity analysis
bc
fP M U
fspec
T
N
ncluster
nP M U
MUL
EXP
D

Bit length of ciphertexts
Sampling rate of PMUs
Frequency of conducting spectrum analysis
length of a time window (number of frequency coefficients)
length of DFT
number of generator clusters
average number of PMUs of a cluster
runtime for one multiplication on group G
runtime for one exponentiation on group G
runtime of decryption for a number in the Paillier cryptosystem.

first analyze the computation and communication overhead of the component
sub-algorithms (Algorithm 2.

through Algorithm 4), and then those of the

main Algorithm. 2. As we assume that the execution time to perform modular
multiplications and exponentiations on group G and the time required for decryption
are the primary computation cost, we express the algorithms’ computation overheads
as functions of M U L and EXP .
4.6.1.1

Execution Time of Sub-algorithms

It is easy to get that Algorithm 3 takes T3 = 2M U L, since it requires one addition
for the real part and another one for the imaginary part.
Similarly, Algorithm 5 requires three exponentiations and one multiplication
to obtain the real part and two exponentiations and one multiplication to get the
imaginary part. Thereby, Algorithm 5 take T5 = 2M U L + 5EXP in total.
Algorithm 4 takes one modular exponentiations and one modular multiplication
to encrypt the real part or the imaginary part of the complex number, so its execution
time is given by T4 = 2(EXP + M U L).
4.6.1.2

Execution Time for One Round of Spectral Estimation

Each of the nc luster clusters requires a spectral estimation, which takes T samples
of the mean-centering cluster angle, and calculates N frequency coefficients. Assume
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spectrum estimations are performed at the frequency of fspec Hz. So, there are

fP M U
hspec

new measurements sent from each PMU for one round of spectral estimation.
For a PMU, all it needs to do is to encrypt all the measurement collected during
the last round of spectral estimation. Therefore, the total execution time for a PMU
is

fP M U
T.
hspec 4

The control room needs to decrypt for the frequency coefficients of ncluster clusters
and each contains N complex numbers. As a result, the total running time for the
control room is 2ncluster N D.
The most computation required by Algorithm 2 is migrated to the cloud servers.
For each cluster, the algorithm first derives the averaged cluster angle, which takes
T · nP M U T3 + T5 . Calculating the iterative means takes T (2T5 + T3 ). Calculating
the mean-centering cluster angle takes T T3 . The algorithm then performs privacypreserving N point Fourier transform over the obtained mean centering cluster angle.
To calculate one frequency coefficient, the algorithm calls Algorithm 5 T times,
Algorithm 3 T times. Hence, in total, the overall execution time to conduct spectral
estimations for ncluster clusters using Algorithm 2 is given by T2 = ncluster T ((nP M U +
N + T + 1)T3 + (3 + N )T5 ))
4.6.1.3

Communication Overhead

For one round of spectrum analysis, the communication overhead for each PMU is
the encrypted measurement data from the last spectrum analysis, which is given by
MU
2bc fhPspec
bits.

Cloud servers receive all bits from all the PMUs, and it also sends the encrypted
frequency coefficients to the control room. So the communication overhead for the
MU
cloud is 2bc fhPspec
∗ nP M U + 2ncluster N bc bits.

The control center receives the encrypted frequency coefficients of the ncluster
clusters, which takes 2ncluster N bc bits.
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4.7

Performance Evaluations

4.7.1

Stress Testing

4.7.1.1

Set Up

We fully implemented the scheme with Java’s BigInteger library and measured the
run time to perform one round of privacy preserving spectral estimation. We use
the key length of 512 bits to initialize the Paillier cryptosystem. All experiments are
conducted on Linux servers with 8-core Intel Core i7 processor and 16GB RAM.
In the stress testing, we test the latency of Algorithm 2 as we gradually increase the
length of the time window. PMU measurements are simulated by random generated
time series of rotor angle measurements at a frequency of 50 Hz. Each measurement
is a decimal number with six decimal places. Because Paillier cryptosystem would
work on ZN , the raw measurement are mapped to ZN with all the decimal places
preserved by multiplying a scaling factor Q = 1, 000, 000,
We measured the execution times of Algorithm 1 before and after the optimization.
The optimization being applied are as follows:
1 precompute the DFT matrix and build an in-memory lookup table before
runtime.
2 compute only the frequency coefficients corresponding to the [0, 1] Hz.
3 parallelize the computation with five servers in the same computer cluster.
Without optimization, Algorithm 1 calculates the whole spectrum and is executed on
a single machine with the hardware specifications mentioned above.
4.7.1.2

Experiment Result

As Table.4.2 shows, the applied optimization reduces the computation overhead by
three orders of magnitude and reduce the communication overhead by one order of
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Table 4.2: Time for execution of Algorithm 1 before and after optimizations
Time window
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000

Algorithm 1
Algorithm 1 optimized
Comm.(kb) Comp.(seconds) Comm.(kb) Comp.(seconds)
75
50.5
13.125
0.06
137.5
209.6
13.75
0.24
200
460.5
14.375
0.53
262.5
816.8
15
0.93
325
1280
15.625
1.44
387.5
1858.2
16.25
2.06
450
2507.4
16.875
2.79
512.5
3305.6
17.5
3.74

magnitude. The communication overhead after optimization grows much slower than
that of the original algorithm. Additionally, the latency can be further reduced by
using more machines working in parallel. In fact, as long as the latency is less than
the period of conducting spectral estimations, the proposed scheme can be used for
online monitoring.

4.7.2

Test with WECC 179-bus Power System

We also tested the proposed scheme with a simplified model of WECC AC
transmission system with 29 generators and 179 buses Sun et al. (2012). As illustrated
in Figure 4.3, offline analysis indicates that generators in the transmission grid is
split into four coherent clusters. Each cluster is monitored by three PMUs, which
are circled in the figure. The sampling rate of the PMUs is 100 Hz. Every second,
privacy-preserving spectral estimation is applied to update the power spectrum of
the cluster angles over the latest 30 second window (containing 3,000 measurements),
with a 29-second overlap with the last time window. As we are monitoring inter-area
oscillations, only coefficients corresponding to [0.1, 0.9] Hz, i.e. , the 3rd through 21th
frequency coefficients, are calculated.
For demonstration purpose, four successive three-phase faults is simulated at 40s,
80s, 120s, and 160s.
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Figure 4.3: Coherent generator clusters in WECC 179 bus system
With the proposed scheme, the control room can obtain the spectral estimations
of four clusters’ averaged rotor angles without the need for the original PMU
measurements. With 15 servers working in parallel, the averaged latency to obtain
spectral estimations for all the four clusters is 0.95 second, which is less than the
period of conducting spectral estimations (1 second).
The encrypted and decrypted spectral estimations over the simulated time are
visualized using spectrograms in Figure. 4.4 and Figure.4.5, respectively. As seen in
the spectrograms, frequency responses emerge and die down as the faults are applied
and cleared. Obvious oscillation modes are seen around 0.2Hz, 0.5Hz, and 0.75 Hz,
with the 0.2 Hz mode being the dominant one. The results of spectral estimations
are in accordance with the result of small-signal analysis. The obtained spectral
estimations can also be used for further research and analysis, which is beyond the
scope of this work.
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Figure. 4.6 further illustrates the access control in the frequency domain. The left
panel of the figure depicts the full spectrogram of the angle of Cluster 2, while the
right panel captures the same spectrogram but with its [0.6, 0.9] Hz range obscured
with a random mask by one of the utility companies in Cluster 2.
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Chapter 5
Secure Data Sharing for
Situational Awareness
5.1

Introduction

Power grids are critical infrastructure, whose reliability plays a significant role in
people’s everyday life and work. For instance, the 2003 Northeast blackout affected
55 million people in eight states in the U.S. and one province in Canada, led to
256 power plants going offline and $6 billion of economic loss Electricity Consumers
Resource Council (2003).

Among the many ways to improve the reliability of

the power grid, situational awareness emerges as a promising and efficient highlevel solution. According to EIOC (2013), “The analyses of recent blackouts have
demonstrated that a major challenge to keeping the lights on is maintaining situational
awareness”. Situational awareness is the practice to capture the changes in the
environment or the subject. It renders the information to human operators for their
perception and comprehension such that they will take the best actions in response
to the changes EIOC (2013). In power system operations, system faults, inclement
environment conditions, or inside/outside agent attackers can all cause the same grave
consequence — a widespread blackout. In such a case, global situational awareness
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is the starting point for any subsequent measures to adequately mitigate system
operation risks, to prevent the spread of malfunction and facilitate fast recovery.
One would imagine that the difficulty to maintain situational awareness stems
from the need to process large amount of data, or from the demand for effective
visualizations to exact and render the information hidden in the data. However,
an even more fundamental reason comes from the unavailability of the data, which
must be collected from multiple utility companies that are potentially competing and
mutually untrusted. For example, the North American power grid’s high voltage
transmission system has more than 80,000 nodes (i.e., busbars) at 69kV. Those nodes
include both substations and power plants. They collectively exist within a hierarchy
consisting of more than 2,000 independent utility companies, over 100 balancing
authorities and eight reliability councils. As pointed out by EIOC (2013), “Since
deregulation, a competitive environment has arisen and complete information about
the state of the power grid is seldom available to operators”. For this reason, to truly
enable global situational awareness, an efficient data sharing mechanism that also
preserves the concerned parties’ privacy is in urgent need.
The challenge to design such a mechanism is threefold. First, the scheme must
guarantee the data privacy of all the participating parties. Second, the mechanism
should attend to the sophisticated structure of the data to be shared. For one
thing, the volume of data is steadily increasing as the time goes by. For the other,
the data required by situational awareness comes in a wide variety. Third, the
data sharing mechanism should be able to adapt to different situations during the
operation of the power grid. More specifically, during normal operations, where
data sharing activities are among different utility companies, privacy preservation
is preferred over performance. As a contrast, when an emergency takes place, the
data sharing is conducted between Independent System Operation (ISO) and affected
utility companies to facilitate real-time situational aware. In such cases, performance,
in terms of low latency and high throughput, becomes the top concern. An ideal
design should satisfy all the three requirements simultaneously.
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In this chapter, we present a novel secure power flow data sharing scheme for
practical power grid situational awareness.

5.2

Related Works

Klump and Weber (2002) indicates that data sharing within the same utility
company is widely adopted by using standard databases with APIs for remote access.
Additionally, that real-time monitoring of the most recent snapshot with 3 to 5
seconds of latency is typical. However, there are strong reservations regarding sharing
operation data across utility companies because of privacy concerns.
Although, to our best knowledge, we are the first to investigate the secure data
sharing in the context of the smart grid, we draw significant inspirations from previous
works of cyber security.
The cybersecurity community has studied the problem of secure storage and
keyword search Sun et al. (2011, 2010); Goh (2003); Curtmola et al. (2006); Liesdonk
et al. (2010); Wang et al. (2012b, 2011a, 2012a,c); Cao et al. (2011b,a); Wang et al.
(2011c); Li et al. (2010a,b). However, a fundamental difference between these works
and our proposed schemes is that existing works do not handle large volumes of data
in real time. As a result, the computational efficiency is not a primary concern for
them, and, thus, their schemes is inefficient to meet the stringent time constraints
required for the time-critical situational awareness.
This work utilizes the evolving key scheme for key management. Evolving key
schemes were previously proposed by Tzeng and Tzeng (2002); Itkis and Xie (2003);
Franklin (2006) to primarily facilitate public key based encryption and signature, and
offer forward secrecy and intrusion resilience and However, the evolving key scheme
proposed in this work is unique in the sense that the hierarchical structure of the key
generation and management is derived from the unique model of the power flow data
being investigated.

97

Finally, various security issues in the power grid by Qi et al. (2011); Bobba et al.
(2009); Khurana et al. (2010a); Rogers et al. (2010); Zhang and Gunter (2010); Wang
et al. (2010b); Kosut et al. (2010); Bakken et al. (2007), but none considered the
challenging issues around secure data sharing.

5.3

System Model

5.3.1

Network Model

In the network model of the proposed scheme, grid operators of participating utility
companies store their real-time power flow data in a data center with massive storage
that is hosted either by the regional ISO or a trusted authority. The data would
be used by the regional ISO or other operators in response to critical events. The
centralized approach facilitates in-situ data processing to eliminate latency incurred
by transferring data to the ISO from multiple utility companies during an emergency,
which could be invaluable for quick remedial measures. However, the data stored in
the data center must be protected such that the data owners, instead of the data
center, have the ultimate access control of its data, such that the data owner can
specify a particular piece of data to be accessed by a certain party. We will elaborate
on this in Section 5.3.3.

5.3.2

Data Model

We derived the data model from the power flow data and is designed to facilitate data
visualizations for situational awareness, which differentiates itself from previous works
designed for general data models. Figure 5.1 captures the model of the power flow
data. In the figure, Tt S m denotes the different time instants (indexed by m) within
the time period (Tt−1 , Tt ], or simply (t − 1, t], and t is the ending time of a period,
e.g. , 20:00:00 11/11/11. We model the data with three dimensions, namely, data
category, time scale, and spatial scale. Data category indicates the type of collected
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Figure 5.1: Data Model.
power flow data, such as overload index (e.g. , instantaneous voltage, current, power),
voltage stability, frequency stability, and transient stability. Time scale represents
data collected in different time periods. Spatial scale indicates the location where
the data is collected. The data model is of a hierarchical structure. The entirety of
the data is first divided into slices according to their categories. Each slice is further
divided into smaller slices based on the time the data is collected. Finally, each
smaller slice contains all the data of the category, obtained at the respective period
at different spatial scales.
In Figure. 5.1, consider the category Dij , say, the overload index, collected during
the master key update period i. It follows that Dij (Tt ) denotes the overload index
values collected in time period t.

Dij (Tt ) can be expressed by a table, where

each row corresponds to a spatial scale, and an element in a row indicates the
overload index value at a particular spatial scale at a specific time instance during
time period t. Data on a same spacial scale within a same time period, e.g. ,
t
Dijk (T S1t ), · · · , Dijk (T Sm
), · · · , are stored in a data file.
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5.3.3

Threat Model

In the threat model, the ISO or the third trusted party, who administrates the data
center, are fully trusted. ISO only requests the concerning utility companies for
accesses to their data when situational awareness is needed for critical events.
Adversaries considered by this work include peer grid operators and attackers
the system. Peer operators are assumed to be honest-but-curious in the sense that
once they are authorized to obtain each other’s data, they will only use the data
for legitimate purposes and will not leak the data to unauthorized parties or outside
attackers. However, they will be curious to learn each other’s sensitive data for their
own advantage, e.g. , economic data for marketing, if there is chance that the data is
unprotected. Outside attackers are malicious as they try to gain access to operators’
data by launching both passive (e.g. , eavesdropping) and active (e.g. , hacking into
the data center) attacks against the data center.

5.3.4

Security Goals

Given the application scenario we are concerned with, our system strives to achieve
three security goals: data privacy, access control, and integrity. Data privacy has two
further aspects: data confidentiality and unlinkability. Data confidentiality requires
that unauthorized entities (e.g. , peer utility companies, outside attackers) must not
learn the data stored in the data center. Unlinkability dictates that unauthorized
entities must not be able to link multiple data files to profile the operator, which
requires that the data should be stored scrambled, appear random, and leak no useful
information. Access control requires that the operator has control over who may
access which portions of the data. The desired access control should support finegrained access control, meaning that the data owner are enabled to control the access
of the smallest data unit, i.e. , a single data file, in this case. Additionally, it should
also be efficiently adjustable. Specifically, it requires that if the data owner is to
grant access to a large set of files, the data owner does not have to permit access to
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every single file, which is time-consuming and inefficient. Last but not least, Data
integrity requires that the operators’ data stored in the data center should remain
intact, and any tampering with the stored data should be detected. This requirement
is particularly crucial for situational awareness since falsified data may cause wrong
decision-making and devastating consequences.

5.4
5.4.1

S 3A Security Architecture
Scheme Overview

The data sharing mechanism for situational awareness consists of two components:
secure and unlinkable data storage and evolving key scheme based key management.
The secure and unlinkable data storage serves as an “encrypted database” that
facilitates searching over encrypted data.

The evolving key scheme based key

management is used to achieve an efficient key management tailored for the particular
power flow data model and the flexible-grained access control. It is worth noting the
two components do not work independently, as later discussions reveal. An overview
of the proposed secure data sharing mechanism for situational awareness follows.
Consider a scenario where the ISO, requests the overload index values collected in
time period t, denoted by Dij (Tt ) by another utility company, called A. The request
is first sent to the data center. The data center then sends the keywords “overload
index” and ”t” to A who owns the data. With the keywords, the operator at A
computes two trapdoors, one for each keyword, and returns the trapdoors to the data
center. Using Secure Index, with the two trapdoors, the data center can then obtain
the file identifiers, which are the pseudonyms for the respective files, and use them to
retrieve the encrypted data files.
Since the retrieved data files are encrypted, the data center still needs to know the
keys to decrypt the files. The operator at Utility A computes the keys with evolving
key scheme based key management, when he or she receives the two keywords
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above, he or she can derive the decryption key given the keywords using the proposed
hierarchical evolving key scheme detailed in Section.5.4.3. Thus, the operator also
returns the keys to the data center. In our example, the keys used to decrypt the
overload index data files collected in the period t are the encryption keys sitting at
the bottom K levels in the key hierarchy. In fact, since all requested files belong to
Dij (Tt ), the operator needs to return only one key, the time scale key corresponding
to Dij (Tt ). With the time scale key and (i, j, t, k), which is shown in the figure, ISO
itself may derive all the file encryption keys in the lower hierarchy. This approach
may be more desirable in situations like a crisis, where transmitting many keys over a
potentially unreliable communication network may not be possible. In either case, the
ISO now obtains all the data it needs and can perform feature extraction according
to the five spatial scales (K = 5) for situational awareness using the decrypted power
flow data. The method to derive the encryption keys will be covered in Section. 5.4.3.

5.4.2

Secure and Unlinkable Data Storage

The secure and unlinkable data storage ensures the security of the data and privacy
of the data owners who stored their data in the remote central data warehouse. It
consists of two parts: 1) encrypted files, each of which is identified by a identifier
that does not reveal any information about the content of the file, and 2) secure
indexes for their respective keywords. Each secure index is associated with a keyword,
which enables searching over the encrypted data. A secure index takes the form of a
linked list, and a node in the linked list represents a encrypted file that contains that
keyword.
The secure indexes, while facilitating searching over encrypted data, should also
guarantee data confidentiality and unlinkability as follows: 1) keywords submitted
for queries should not be exposed to the data center, as it is also part of the private
information, and 2) the linkage from a keyword to the set of files that contain that
keyword should also remain unexposed to the data center without a legitimate request
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BEGIN
F (health data file collection)
C,i=1 (counters)
Q=0 (NxN matrix)
B=0 (array of N elements)

q=j+1
l=l+1

m=randi(N)
if m==1
M=(p)
else
M=(i randi(N,1,m-1))
=(M[1] M[2] M[m])
for n=1:m
k=M[n]
Qi,k=1
r=B[M[n]]
B[M[n]]=r+1
end for
p=p+1

l==|F(kwz)|?

Y
N
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s=s+1
N

p>N?
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s>B[p]?

p=1

Y

p>N?

N

N

Y

q,l=0,s=1,z=p

Continue finding the xth column
in Qi whose value is 1
z=x, l=0

SI=(A,T)

END

Figure 5.2: Construction of Secure Index
to the data owner. That is, by examining the a secure index, one should not be able
to link the encrypted files that belong to that secure index to the respective keyword
of the secure index, even though both the keyword and the files are encrypted.
These security features cannot be achieved by only using random numbers as the
indexing method. Section 5.4.2.1 presents the details about how to satisfy the security
requirement in details.
5.4.2.1

Secure Data Storage

The operator Pn at a particular utility company constructs a secure index for the data
files using the algorithm. Figure.5.2 shows the procedures. The input to the algorithm
is the plaintext data file collection F and counters C and x (both starting from 1). The
notations in Figure.5.2 are defined as follows. SI consists of an array A and a lookup
table T . A[∗] = z (and similarly T [∗]) denotes the value z is stored in A[∗]. The
collection of linked lists L = {Lx |x = 1, · · · , |kw|} (where |kw| denotes the size of the
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keyword space) is encrypted and stored in A. Further, each linked list Lx is a collection
of nodes Lx,y such that Lx = {Lx,y |y = 1, · · · , |F (kw)|} (where |F (kw)| denotes the
number of data files containing kw). Each linked list node contains three fields in
Curtmola’s construction Curtmola et al. (2006), i.e. , Lx,y = (f idx,y k λx,y k ptr)
where k denotes concatenation and f idx,y is a unique file identifier, λx,y of length ξ
is the secret key used to encrypt the next node Lx,y+1 in the linked list Lx , and
ptr contains the address of the encrypted Lx,y+1 (i.e. , Eλx,y (Lx,y+1 )). The first
node Lx,1 is addressed by addrx,1 . The pointer ptr is the output of a pseudorandom
permutation prp computed from the data owner secret a. Similarly, prp0 is another
pseudorandom permutation computed from the secret c. The keyword is encrypted
by a pseudorandom function prf computed from the secret b. We added a new field
(i k j k t k k) to a linked list node for identifying and regenerating the right encryption
key. We will provide justification for this design shortly in Section 5.4.2.2.
The operator Pn then encrypts the data files with the encryption keys (δk ’s)
generated from the evolving key scheme (Section. 5.4.3) and stores the encryptions
in the data center. Fig.5.3 shows an example that includes data files containing
different keywords, the construction of their linked lists, a search based on the keyword
“transient stability” and the data retrieval.
Finally, a question remains — how often do the operators of different utility
companies update their power flow data at the data center. The update frequency
has a significant impact on both the efficiency of the data sharing mechanism and
the accuracy of the resulted situational awareness. When an operator updates its
respective power flow data, the operator sends a new set of data files to be stored
in the data center, and the data center needs to construct a new secure index over
this set. In general, ∆ updates will result in ∆ different data files collections and
associated secure indexes. As a result, at least ∆ trapdoors and ∆ searches are
needed to retrieve all data files (in different collections) containing a keyword since
a trapdoor computed based on one secure index cannot be used to search over other
data collections. If the update period is too small, it is prohibitively expensive for
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Figure 5.3: An example of the access-pattern-preserving SI construction process.
The construction is for five files involving two keywords. Two linked lists each created
for a keyword and a search based on the keyword ”transient stability”. T in SI is
used to find the address of the first linked list node L2,1 stored in A. The symmetric
key λ2,0 is used to decrypt this node. Shaded nodes are encrypted.
our data-intensive application. In contrast, if the update period is too large, the
situational awareness does not reflect the up-to-date situation about the power grid.
In fact, secure and efficient updates of secure indexes is an open problem in the
literature. Fortunately, since power flow data is used in critical events, our modeling
of data provides a solution to the problem in the particular context. A few minutes
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worth of data before the events are most important for situational awareness. For
this reason, if we let the update period of associated data files and their secure index
be twice as long as this interval, we can ensure that the most critical data will fall
into a single data collection.
5.4.2.2

Secure Data Search

Besides the usage in critical situational awareness, the data center can also serve
as the modern storage-as-a-service model to archive power flow data from different
utility companies. It is straightforward for the operator Pn to search and retrieve
its data files stored in the data center. In this case, Pn just needs to compute the
trapdoors for the keywords it wants to search, i.e. , T Dkw =< prp0c (kw), prfb (kw) >
for each keyword, and send the trapdoors to the data center. The data center will
decrypt the linked lists using the trapdoors and return the encrypted data files to
Pn as shown in Fig. 5.3. This is the search mechanism provided by the original
construction of secure index. However, it bears the drawback of lacking guarantee
of hiding the access pattern and search pattern, which is also considered as a sidechannel private information during private information retrieval. We give a solution
to address the problem as follows.
The basic idea is to extend a linked list to contain other keywords in addition to
the intended one. For example, linked list Li contains only nodes Li,j , ∀j ∈ [1, |Kwi |].
In the proposed pattern hiding scheme, each linked list will hold multiple (but not the
same number of) keywords and each keyword will appear in many (but not the same
number of) linked lists, e.g., Li is now constructed to include two other keywords kwg
and kwh . Then Li should contain all nodes for the three keywords, i.e. , Li,j , ∀j ∈
[1, |kwi |], Lg,j , ∀j ∈ [1, |kwg |] and Lh,j , ∀j ∈ [1, |kwh |]. To search for kwh -related
files, the operators can deliberately submit a trapdoor calculated from kwi . As the file
identifiers associated with all the three keywords will be returned, the operator can
select the ones containing the desired keyword kwh . Similarly, since kwi is included
in the other linked lists, say Lo , the operator can submit a search based on kwo to
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disguise the actual search for kwi -related files. The pattern hiding scheme is described
as follows for each keyword i in the keyword space:
1. Randomly select an integer m between 1 and N = |kw| where N is also the
number of linked list to be constructed. The integer m determines how many
different linked lists will contain kwi .
2. Then randomly generate an array of m − 1 integers between 1 and N , indicating
which linked lists will include kwi besides Li . We can keep running this process
until we have m distinct integers. Suppose i = 1, N = 8, m = 4, and the array
of integers M = (1 8 4 5). The array M shows the positions of kwi , i.e. , kwi
is contained in the ith, 4th, 5th and 8th linked lists.
3. Record the positions of kwi in a matrix Q by setting the corresponding elements
to 1 (otherwise 0), e.g., Qi,k = 1 represents the ith keyword is contained in the
kth linked list. Sum the columns of Q and record the results in an array B,
which indicates how many different keywords are contained in the corresponding
linked lists. Using the above example, the first row of Q is Q1 = (1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1).
Suppose as the process continues, Q2 = (0 1 0 1 0 0 1), then B = (1 1 0 2 1 0 0 2)
indicating the 1st, 2nd and 5th linked lists contain 1 keyword, the 4th and 8th
linked lists include 2 keywords, and so on.
4. The actual construction of linked list is based on array B and matrix Q. Suppose
the 1st linked list L1 contains three keywords kw1 , kw7 and kw8 . We start the
construction by linking all nodes for kw1 first. The last node for kw1 , L1,|kw1 |
will be linked to the first node for kw7 (or kw8 ), L7,1 (or L8,1 ), etc.

5.4.3

Evolving Key Based Flexible-Grained Access Control

5.4.3.1

Hierarchical Evolving Keys

In previous discussions, every file stored in the data center is associated with three
attributes, i.e. the three dimensions of data model: the data category, time scale,
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and spatial scale. As such, attribute-based encryption Goyal et al. (2006) seems a
good fit to enforce the access control mechanism of the data. However, ABE is not
the optimal solution in this context for two considerations. First, attribute-based
encryption and other public-key cryptosystem are not suitable for encrypting large
chunks of data because they necessitate an enormous amount of computationally
expensive modular exponentiation (e.g. , RSA Rivest et al. (1978)) and pairing (e.g. ,
identity-based encryption Boneh and Franklin (2003), Goyal et al. (2006)), which
make the encryption and decryption very slow. Second, even though we may use
ABE to encrypt only the symmetric keys that are used to encrypt the files to avoid
the problem, as the time constantly elapses, the universe of attributes of the ABE
keeps growing, making the solution inefficient and unscalable Goyal et al. (2006).
As a solution, we propose a hierarchical evolving key scheme employing only the
secret key encryption. This evolving key scheme is designed based on the data model
in Fig. 5.1. Assuming there are N grid operators, without loss of generality, the figure
shows the data model of operator Pn . The secret keys used by Pn are generated as
follows:
α: α is the root master key.
β: βi = Eα (i) (i ∈ [1, I]) is the temporary master key for the period Ui .
γ: γj = Eβi (j) (j ∈ [1, J]) is the category key for data category Dij and the
time scale seed key for Dij ’s data collected in different time periods.
θ: θt = Eγj (t) is the time scale key for the data in category Dij collected in
time period (t − 1, t].
δ: δk = Eδk−1 (k) (k ∈ [1, K]) is the encryption key for the data on spacial
scale k, Dijk , within the time period (t − 1, t], and δ0 = θt . Data on a same
t
spacial scale within a same time period, e.g. , Dijk (T S1t ), · · · , Dijk (T Sm
), · · · ,

constitute a data file that is encrypted by δk .
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The root master key α is used to generate all other keys and, thus, is the only key
that needs to be securely stored. Referring to Fig. 5.1, βi is generated for each time
period Ui for master key update. It is, in general, a bad security practice to use a
secret key for long either to generate other keys or to encrypt data, because keys
“wear out” after certain uses. Thus, it is desirable to change the master key once
in a while. The more frequently a temporary master key is used, the more often we
should update it, or in other words, the shorter we should let the period Ui be. γj
is generated for each data category, which includes all data of this category collected
in different time periods T ’s within the period Ui (Ui  Tt ). θt is generated for the
collected data in each time period, e.g. , Dij (Tt ). The collected data further include
t
individual datums (e.g. , Dijk (T Sm
)) obtained at different time instances T S’s within

the time period Tt . Each datum has different spatial scales for visualization purpose
t
), · · · ). The key for
and δk is generated for each scale (e.g. , Dijk (T S1t ), · · · , Dijk (T Sm

higher spatial scale is used to generate the keys for lower scales, e.g. , δk−1 is used
to generate δk and below. This is because if access to a particular spatial scale is
allowed, then access to all lower scales is also allowed.
In essence, the δk ’s are the actual keys encrypting/decrypting the data files. All
the upper-level keys in the key hierarchy, i.e. , βi ’s, γj ’s, and θt ’s, are intermediate
keys that are used to create an efficient key management scheme and re-generate the
δk ’s, and are never used to encrypt a file.
Note that the evolving key scheme also offers efficient data integrity protection.
Data integrity can be ensured by a keyed hash (e.g. , HMAC, CBC residue) computed
over and appended to each data file. The secret key used by the keyed hash can be the
same as the encryption/decryption key for the data file. However, a better security
practice would be to use different keys for encryption and integrity protection. For
example, our encryption keys are generated as δk = Eδk−1 (k) (k ∈ [1, K]), δ0 = θt .
We can add an extra branch under θt in the key hierarchy for the integrity keys φk as
φk = Eφk−1 (k) (k ∈ [1, K]), φ0 = Eθt (2), and modify δ0 to be δ0 = Eθt (1). This is in

109

accordance with the fact that the encryption and integrity protection keys for a data
file always come in pairs.
5.4.3.2

Flexible-Grained Access Control

Flexible-grained access control takes advantage of the most important property of
the evolving keys: keys are constructed in a hierarchical fashion. On one hand, the
lower-level keys can be efficiently derived from the upper-level key given the auxiliary
information i.e. the files’ categories, time scales, location scale. For instance, given a
temporary master key αi and the indices (j, t, k), it is trivial to find the encryption key
δk that is used to encrypt the corresponding data file. On the other hand, the reverse
cannot be done i.e. it is impossible to derive a upper-level key from a lower-level key.
By granting the data requester a high-level key, the data provider grants coarsegrained access, as the auxiliary information can be found in the secure index. By
giving only the keys used to encrypt individual files, the data provider limits the data
requester’s access to only the set of files corresponding tot he encryption keys.
Coarse-grained access is advantageous in situations where efficiency and requirement for low-latency take priority over the data security and privacy. When the
data center needs data from the grid operators for situational awareness, it will send
requests to the operators including the needed keywords. In fact, the operators are
likely to know roughly what data are useful for this purpose. For example, 5 to 10
minutes worth of data prior to the event is usually needed for situational awareness.
The operators will send the corresponding trapdoors and key(s) to the data center
upon detecting the event, without the data center requesting it. The data center
will first use the trapdoors to decrypt the linked lists and then extract the indices
(i k j k t k k) and file identifiers from the linked list nodes. Coarse-grained access
control is desirable in this case because the timely generation of results for situational
awareness is of top priority. Accordingly, the operators may choose to reveal more
data than necessary, for example, the data of an entire category Dij , thus trading
security for efficiency. The adjustability is critical because it may not be feasible for
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the operators to select the encryption keys for the particular data files needed by the
data center during the course of situational awareness. Using the above example, all
information needed from the operators is a single data category key γj and the data
center enjoys the freedom to select the most useful files at a later time. Since the
data center has the category key and the indices (i k j k t k k), it can generate any
encryption key by first generating the appropriate time scale key. The method for
deriving the keys are discussed in the evolving key scheme (Section. 5.4.3). Finally,
the derived encryption keys will be used to decrypt the data files indexed by the file
identifiers.
In contrast, fine-grained access is more desirable in the scenarios where the data
provider want specific files to be shared. The following scenario illustrates such
scenarios. When grid operators, say Pn and Pn+1 , need to share data in order to
respond to some local events, they will send each other trapdoors associated with
the keywords allowed for search. Fine-grained access control is more desirable in this
case because it helps the data provider to expose only the data that is necessary
for this incident to its competitors. For example, Pn only allows Pn+1 to see the
data on the bottom two spacial scales, e.g. , Dij(K−1) and DijK , within a strict time
period, e.g. , (t − 1, t], for a certain event. Then Pn only sends the encryption key
δK−1 to Pn+1 . If more data are needed, Pn+1 must make additional requests. Upon
receiving the trapdoors and keys, Pn+1 will submit the trapdoors to the data center
that returns the associated encrypted files. These files will then be decrypted using
the encryption keys received from Pn . When the stored data are retrieved for the
data owner operator’s use or for other operators, the data center serves merely as a
storage server that is not authorized to know what keywords are being searched. The
strictness of the access control can be adjusted by the evolving key scheme.
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5.5

Security Analysis

In this section, we show that our proposed schemes meet the security goals put forth
in Section 3.3.
Privacy: As stated in section 3.3, data privacy in this work involves two aspects:
data confidentiality and unlinkability.

For data confidentiality, we consider two

scenarios that may potentially compromise data confidentiality, that is, when the
data is stored in the data center and when the operator searches over its own data.
There are two kinds of data stored in the data center, i.e. the encrypted files and
Secure Index. The confidentiality of files depends on the strength of the algorithm
for data encryption, which is assumed to be secure against cryptographic attacks. In
addition, considering that keys ”wear out” with frequent applications, the security
is further fortified by the practice of updating the master key periodically. When
we consider the confidentiality of Secure Index, we want to make sure that the
sensitive information, including keywords, file identifiers, and decryption keys in
the Secure Index will not be leaked. First, in the lookup table of Secure Index,
keywords are stored in the ciphertext of prpt0c (kW ) instead of in plaintext. Second,
also in the lookup table, the address and decryption key of the first node of a
linked list are masked by the output of a pseudorandom function as it is shown in
T [prpt0c (kw)] = (addrx,1 kγx,0 ) ⊕ prfb (kw). Since the decryption of a linked list node
requires the decryption key and ptr stored in the previous node, all the subsequent
nodes would not be revealed to anyone who does not know the secret b. We refer the
reader to Thm. 3 in Goh (2003) for the mathematical proof. Another scenario that
has the potential to cause data confidentiality breaches is when the operator executes
searching and retrieving. When the operator wants to fetch the files containing a
keyword kW, it would compute a trapdoor T D(kw) = prptc (kw) and submits the
trapdoor to the data center. By submitting the trapdoor instead of the kw, the
data center will not be able to know the content of the keyword. We next discuss the
second aspect of privacy, i.e. , unlinkability, which requires that unauthorized entities
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must not be able to link multiple data files to profile the operator. We realize this
property by storing the files to the addresses that are decided by the pseudorandom
permutation ptr = prpa (C) Curtmola et al. (2006). As a result, the files are stored
scrambled and appear randomly, and physically adjacent nodes do not have logical
relations, for instance, sharing the same keywords or belonging to the same operator.
Fine-grained access control : This property requires that the operator who owns
the data has control over who can access which portion of the data. The major
challenge is to make sure that the authorized party can only access the portion it
is authorized to access. Note that the encryption key is derived from its immediate
upper-level key with AES. For instance, the encryption key for the data in category
Dij is given by θt = Eγj (k), where γj is the key for category Dij and the upper-level
key in this case and E denotes the encryption algorithm in use, i.e. , AES in our
schemes. The use of AES ensures that it is computationally infeasible to reverse the
encryption and obtain the key of higher hierarchy from that of a low one.
Data integrity: Data integrity is guaranteed by a keyed hash (e.g., HMAC, CBC
residue). The keyed hashes are computed from the files and are appended to data
files, as we described earlier. The real challenge lies in the key management is difficult
to manage so many keys associated with a huge number of files. Fortunately, this
issue has been solved by adding extra branches in the evolving key scheme.

5.6

Performance Evaluation

We implemented a prototype of the proposed data sharing mechanism in Java
programming language. and evaluate the performance of the prototype in terms
of latency of the proposed scheme. To evaluate the performance, we generate our
test files by vertically partitioning the real power flow data from the 2,736 bus Polish
system test case provided by MATPOWER Zimmerman et al. (2011). Each test file
contains a JSON object that holds a list of keywords and a matrix of the power flow
data about a number of entities in the power system and the file’s keywords. The
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Table 5.1: Runtime of common operations of the proposed data sharing mechanism
for situational awareness
Operations
Generating a trapdoor

Average runtime
0.001 ms

Querying one keyword

0.004 ms

Deriving a encryption key
Encrypt one file
Decrypt one file

0.004 ms
0.035 ms
0.035 ms

Note
retrieve the responsive
encrypted files
in a four hierarchy data model
throughput is 275 MB/s
throughput is 273 MB/s

rows of the matrix correspond to buses, generators, or branches. A test file typically
contains one hundred rows, which partitions all power flow data in the test cases
into seventy files. The columns of the matrix are the parameters about the each
entity (bus, generator, or branch). These include real power demand, reactive power
deman, voltage magnitude, etc. . A list of parameters of the test cases can be found
in Zimmerman et al. (2011). The keywords of a files includes the related bus numbers
and the names of the parameters. The average size of these files is 0.017MB.
In the experiment, we first build the secure index with all the test files and their
associated keywords. We then outsource the generated secure index and their AES
encrypted test files to the S3A server, where the evaluations are performed. Our
evaluation results are presented in Table 5.1. The measured runtimes listed in the
table are the average of 100 measurements taken on a workstation with Intel Core i7
CPU and 8 GB RAM running Java Virtual Machine (JVM) Version 1.8 and Linux
operating system. The key size of the AES encryption is 128 bits.
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Chapter 6
Conclusions and Future Work
In this study, we investigate data security and privacy problems that span the whole
life cycle of the data in the smart grid.
First, in Chapter 2, we conducted a vulnerability assessment of the phasor
network by the mean of penetration tests. The penetration test consists of three
phases: reconnaissance, exploration, and exploit development. By testing techniques,
including packet sniffing, packet injection, fuzzing, we have identified vulnerabilities
associated with the IEEE C37.118 and the specific software implementations of the
PMU and PDC under test. We also showed that the found vulnerabilities can impact
phasor network based Wide-area monitoring system (WAMS) by demonstrating how
can an attacker exploit the found vulnerabilities to perform a data stream hijacking
attack to manipulate the situational awareness result based on the real-time phasor
measurement data.

We also present security recommendations to mitigate the

vulnerabilities and enhance the data security of the phasor network. Future work will
consider more complex, e.g. multilayered large scale phasor networks and attempt to
identify relevant vulnerabilities.
In Chapter 3, we presented a novel approach, which combines the disguising
technique and the code obfuscation, to secure the outsourcing of non-linear power
system dynamic simulations against potential privacy breaches. We implemented
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and tested the proposed schemes. It is shown that the trade-off between feasibility,
efficiency, and security has been made. Future work will focus on improving the
security protection by replacing code obfuscation with provably secure homomorphic
encryption and garbled circuit.
In Chapter 4, we presented a cloud-assisted multiparty spectrum estimation for
inter-area oscillation monitoring. The proposed scheme leverages the additive homomorphic Paillier cryptosystem to enable computations directly over the encrypted
data so as to ensure the participants’ privacy. The proposed scheme also enables
access control in the frequency domain. Security and complexity analysis are carried
out, which showed that our proposed scheme is scalable, efficient, and secure. Future
work will investigate method to build auditability, by, for example, enable the control
room to validate the cloud server’s work in zero knowledge, so we can relax the
assumption that the cloud servers are semi-honest. Another research direction worth
considering is to extend the idea of using homomorphic cryptographies to build
privacy protection into more PMU data. applications.
In Chapter 5, we proposed S 3 A, a secure data sharing mechanism for global
situational awareness of the power grid. The contributions of our proposed schemes
are listed as follows:
1. design of secure and unlinkable data sharing mechanisms that enable peer
operators to outsource and share their data without compromising their
privacy using light-weighted private key cryptography encryption. To our best
knowledge, our proposed schemes are the first to consider the data sharing in
critical events of the power grid.
2. design of novel key generation and management mechanisms that are specific
to the unique model of power flow data to achieve fine-grained access control.
The proposed architecture achieved desired security goals and have a satisfactory
performance with respective to low-latency and high-throughput.
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